

I am just a weary traveller,
Travelling through this world of woe,
But I'm working for that morning,
When there'll be peace down here below.¹

It was primarily on the protest marches themselves that the activists embodied the movements and the definitions of 'peace', national identity, and international relations they stood for, and that they expressed their desire for security against the threat of nuclear war. They were a key part of what Wini Breines has called 'prefigurative politics': the marchers' performance symbolized the world the marchers wanted to construct.² On the marches, the boundary between the activists and the society surrounding them became visible. At the same time, the marches themselves symbolized the journey which the activists intended their society as a whole to take.³ It was by marching and protesting that British and West German protesters came to experience fellowship and belonging: they came to feel as a band of 'lonely pilgrims', 'travelling through this world of woe'.⁴ The marches were **(p.191)** experiences of conversion and signified progress towards what activists dreamt of as a more civilized world: 'On the road from Aldermaston we shall be marching from the tyranny of destruction to the beginnings of creative democracy.'⁵

For many activists, 'belonging' to something posed a dilemma, either because, like the former communists in Britain or the left-wing Social Democrats and pacifists in the Federal Republic, they had not yet overcome their previous senses of belonging; or because they had never felt that they belonged to a specific political or social group. Yet, at the same time, taking part in protests gave them a clear label, as Sheila Rowbotham observes: 'Back in Leeds, I wore my CND badge ... with pride. I had turned into a kind of collective outsider now; people fell away from me in W. H. Smith. We had touched on a twitchy nerve of state security and were now denounced as hoodlums in the newspapers.'⁶

West German protesters encountered similar reactions.⁷ But in a political system that was on the front line of the cold war they had different implications. While police reactions were not generally more heavy-handed or authoritarian than in Britain and public reactions were not more adversarial per se, the establishment of a movement beyond the labour movement and the peace associations was itself a highly controversial and contested political act.

The emotions of marching, singing, and protesting together as well as encountering often inimical reactions from observers forged the protesters together into a community, increasing the political distance between them and their observers or opponents. For many activists, the experience of marching together on the Easter weekends in the company of individuals they would

normally avoid or ignore broke many of the social codes with which they had structured their lives. The marches were, therefore, life-changing experiences. They not only allowed protesters to express their experiences and expectations, but also made the protesters part of a new community.⁸

Yet the marches were also part of the movements' communication efforts. They advertised the cause, not only through the speeches held, but also **(p.192)** through the marching order, the route, and the timing.⁹ Most of the interaction between protesters and the society surrounding them was, however, no longer merely through face-to-face encounters. It was frequently mediated through reports in newspapers and, to a lesser degree, on the radio and on TV.¹⁰ Although there were many strands and developments within each campaign, they constituted, from hindsight at least, one coherent movement. This coherence was achieved through the unity of themes to which the speakers and rallies referred and through the ways in which the media reported on them. The movements observed the societies around them and tried to appeal to them. At the same time, they were observed by the media. This chapter examines the processes through which the protest marches and other forms of demonstration came to constitute the 'movements' and the forms of activism and citizenship connected with them. In particular, it analyses how the two movements were connected, and how similar ideas had specific resonances within the two national contexts. It also discusses the ideas of activism connected with the movements.

Secular processions

While the demonstrations organized by the Campaign against Atomic Death had still resembled the model of public assemblies championed by the nineteenth-century labour movement, the British Aldermaston and West German Easter Marches transcended this model. They no longer showed parallel lines of bodies and the integration of individuals into a mass of people striving for a common goal.¹¹ Instead, the marchers strove to show their individuality. It was the differences among the marchers, their vivid, yet solemn character and the lack of cohesion, that struck observers when looking at pictures taken at the Easter Marches. On photographs, we can see women and men with prams, often wearing duffle coats. Children accompanied the march, and many activists carried musical instruments (see Figure 3).¹²

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More than the one-day gatherings of the Campaign against Atomic Death, the Aldermaston Marches and the West German Easter Marches thus created an own order of time and space that was highly symbolic. The term 'movement' expresses a notion of temporal change as a spatial path.¹³ The very act of marching over Easter thus became an expression of movement towards more security and symbolized the conquest of an own regime of time and space. At the same time, the marches visibly separated the activists from the society around them and thus made the movement distinctly visible.

(p.194) The Easter weekend was particularly apt for such connotations, as it carried Christian notions of new beginnings and the resurrection. Through the marches, the protesters endowed Easter with their own meanings. Instead of going to church and for the traditional Easter walk (*Osterspaziergang*) with their families, the protesters went on the march, thus redefining the Christian message of Easter in explicitly political terms, transcending the norms of privacy at the time and yet expressing their own private moral economies. It was this language of pacifist brotherhood and not the political rationality of socialism that was at the root of British and West German extra-parliamentary protests in the 1960s when they argued for 'a new, world-wide security policy'.¹⁴ Not many activists were quite as exuberant about the Easter message as student leader Rudi Dutschke, who noted in his diary on 14 April 1963: 'Jesus has risen, joy and gratitude accompany this day; the revolution, the decisive revolution of world history has happened, the revolution of the world through all-transcendent love.'¹⁵

Such a rhetoric of the discovery of human fellowship and love could also be found in Britain and has its roots in specific Protestant traditions.¹⁶ But there were subtle differences to West German interpretations. CND supporters asserted after the marches: 'The brotherhood of man is no longer a notion, it's here.'¹⁷ In West Germany, by contrast, protesters were less certain about whether this kind of brotherhood already existed. At the end of the Easter Marches in the Rhineland, they sang, to the tune of a famous children's lullaby and thereby conceptualized the marches themselves as the origins for the dynamic creation of a community of activists. Like the *sýmbolon* that helped Christians in the Roman Empire recognize each other, the emotions that they




Figure 3. Aldermaston March, Easter 1958. (Photograph courtesy of CND)

had gathered on the marches would serve as a sign for the progress of their campaign:

Now go home, preserve the dream/which we have all had

.

Peace is not a shadow.

Only don't fear the darkness that will surround us.

Even if the night falls black and tight/a small star light will have risen.¹⁸

(p.195) For some British protesters, the marches were annual calls for repentance and renewal, both a physical act of atonement and a spiritual revival. The thousands of marchers who strolled through the countryside evoked such national myths as Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. One CND supporter described the march as 'a civilising mission, a march away from fear towards normality, towards human standards, towards the real people in the nursery rhyme whose houses are over the hill but not so far away that we will not get there by candlelight, whose hands are set to the plough and the making of things'.¹⁹ British activists' aim was to bridge the gap between their own civility, composure, and earnestness and what they regarded as their uncivil surroundings. The marches were, therefore, also educational experiences. British marchers also regarded their activism as a means that helped them both discover the dangers that nuclear weapons posed and make these threats visible, first to themselves and then to society: 'Many must have been surprised by the immensity of the enclosed area [of the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston] and struck by the brutal contrast between the dark, dense forest of rich pine through which we had just marched and the planned waste land of man-made structures with which we were suddenly confronted. It all had a nightmarish quality.'²⁰

'Peace' and 'security' thus became something that happened in the direct experiences between people, in the family, whereas 'war' was an anonymous and institutional force.²¹ Throughout, the British and West German organizers emphasized 'self-discipline', not least to counter accusations by the public, by the police, and by the media that they disturbed the public peace.²² A briefing paper for the first Aldermaston March, calling it a 'procession', requested that participants 'march in single file along the lanes, it is not necessary to keep 15 yards apart as in London. Our line of approach is that we are only expecting to behave as a party of hikers, except that we are hikers who have not come to admire the countryside but to present a point of view.'²³

(p.196) In practice, however, the march organizers were not always successful in achieving this aim. There were reports of activists camping at illicit sites, or

leaving the main column of the march.²⁴ Moreover, the finely scripted procession did not, in practice, always work out in fostering social bonds within. Martin Grainger, a CND activist on the first march, wrote with disappointment about everyone just leaving after the final appeal had been read out at Aldermaston on Easter Monday 1958: 'The appeal was not very successful,' he remarked. 'People persisted in drifting away. They had heard it all so many times before.'²⁵

Throughout, the organizers tried to tap a code of respectability and disapproved of any spontaneous disruptions of the orderly structure of the march. On the 1959 March, the CND Annual Conference agreed that 'to preserve the dignity and unity of the March ... and to prevent invidious distinction or misunderstanding, it should be conducted without shouting of slogans and with periods of silence'.²⁶

Aldermaston

The first British demonstration was a three-day 'walk' over Easter from Trafalgar Square to the village of Aldermaston, around fifty miles away, just outside Slough in Berkshire and the site of the nuclear weapons research establishment. The journalist and CND organizer Mervyn Jones later recalled that the weather was atrocious, 'with bitter cold and incessant rain', which turned to snow. While the crowd on Trafalgar Square had been a good one, it was in danger of falling apart later on.²⁷ The marchers carried banners with black and white 'Ban the Bomb' slogans. Some held boards with the CND symbol, later more generally associated with peace movements around the world, others wore CND buttons. On Easter Sunday 1958, services were held on fields nearby.²⁸

When the direction of the march was reversed from 1959 onwards, the services were replaced by speeches of notables, often practising clergy, such as Canon Collins or the Methodist Donald Soper.²⁹ On the march **(p.197)** and when they entered towns, the protesters sang songs. Over the years, a whole repertoire of songs developed, such as 'Don't you Hear the H-Bomb's Thunder', usually to old trade-union or labour-movement tunes. From 1959 onwards, jazz bands and skiffle groups accompanied the march. On one march, even a Calypso band with Rastafarians played songs from the Caribbean.³⁰ The press often highlighted beards and duffle coats, often to the distaste of some CND organizers, as the main characteristics of CND activists. At the same time, some marchers tried to maintain standards: one could still see sombre, older men in long grey macs, with carefully polished shoes.³¹

Many blues and skiffle musicians had close links to the movement. Especially at CND meetings in university towns, music was played and poetry was read and discussed.³² And, while music was never as controversial on British marches, it raised some problems: 'The Englishman, unlike the American, doesn't sing edifying songs, and unlike the Irishman hasn't any songs of recent currency

known to middle-class marchers which symbolise “damn the Government”, like the Peeler and the Goat, or the Sean Bhean Bhocht, even when only whistled.’³³

Like the music and banners, the elaborately planned structure of the march was supposed to convey the image of both order and variety. There were usually different sections in the march. The famous members of the executive walked ahead to endow the march with credibility. Different regional and local groups followed, together with CND's professional suborganizations, catering for students, Christians, or scientists. In another section of the march, foreign guests walked with banners stating their country of origin.³⁴ Although there were Scottish campaigns against the *Polaris* submarine depot at Holy Loch from the early 1960s onwards, these campaigns were, because of their direct-action character, never perceived as an integral part of CND.³⁵ Scottish and Welsh CND supporters travelled to southern England and London to participate in the marches.³⁶

(p.198) The organizers changed the direction of the route in subsequent years, ending with a rally on Trafalgar Square rather than on a field in the Berkshire countryside. This indicates the increasing importance that the organizers gave to political demonstrations at the centre of power, Westminster and Whitehall, rather than the remote countryside, where there was a lack of reporting and attention for the cause. Moreover, the change of route attracted more people and underlined the London-centric character of the British campaign. It attracted 20,000 people in 1959. For 1960, the estimates for the final rally on Trafalgar Square vary between 60,000 and 100,000 participants. In 1961, about 45,000 people participated, making the rallies the largest demonstrations London had seen since VE Day. From 1962 onwards, participation declined, and no full marches took place from 1964 onwards.³⁷

The West German ‘Easter Marches’

The British marches themselves served as a ‘model’ for the West German Easter Marches when a group of Hamburg Quakers around Hans-Konrad Tempel revived the flagging Campaign against Atomic Death by staging an Aldermaston-style march in northern Germany. This emergence of the two campaigns within the framework of the British ‘model’ and West German ‘imitation’ is itself interesting, as it neglects the fact that Gandhi's non-violence resistance in India had been a mutual reference point for British and West German pacifists in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It had been their engagement with Gandhi's methods that had opened up this new space for political involvement. The story of this translation process was also the story of a transition from discussion towards production of new forms of politics, from latency to realization.³⁸

For British and West German pacifists in the mid- to late 1940s Gandhi was primarily an icon, whom they slotted into primarily Christian narratives of suffering.³⁹ While the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) formed a Non-Violence

Commission in 1949 that met regularly from January 1950 in Dick Shepard's house and while West German activists were aware of this, **(p.199)** the PPU had not yet officially endorsed non-violent direct action as a campaign strategy. The focus was 'study' and 'self-training'. Information was exchanged through a 'travelling file'.⁴⁰ It is only on the basis of dissatisfaction with these discussions that some British pacifists demanded moving towards action. In January 1951, Ethel A. Lewis wrote to Kathleen Rawlins: 'I really feel that it is rather useless to merely meet pleasantly at intervals, to talk—waiting vaguely for the day when it might be useful to lay [sic] down in the road to demonstrate agst. "something or other"'.⁴¹ A campaign called 'Operation Gandhi' was founded by the pacifist Hugh Brock in December 1951 as an experiment in practising direct action in order to awaken Britons' conscience.⁴² They staged a number of protests at nuclear and chemical warfare installations across the country, and also took part in a transnational campaign against apartheid in South Africa.⁴³ In late 1957, activists from 'Operation Gandhi' met to discuss new forms of direct action, such as larger-scale protest marches. Alex Comfort, a PPU activist (later the author of *The Joy of Sex*), gave the reasons for choosing the Aldermaston atomic weapons research establishment as the site for annual marches: 'It covers an area of nearly two square miles and is some tow [sic] or three miles from Aldermaston railway station. Something like 50 squatters would be required to make an effective demonstration at the main gate ... but a squat would be of great rallying value to the pacifist movement and should be of news value.'⁴⁴ The establishment of these annual marches meant that, although both West German and British pacifists shared an awareness of the links to Gandhi, the transnational origins of the British marches disappeared from public discussions, and the British marches themselves became a model for protests.⁴⁵

The West German marches remained much more localized than the British ones, and their observers emphasized the solemn character of the march. The first Easter March started in Hamburg on Good Friday and **(p.200)** was to reach the rocket site Bergen-Hohne, around eighty miles away, on Easter Monday. Some 120 protesters marched in twosomes or threesomes on pavements or on the verges, as the use of public road space had been prohibited by the police. Behind a banner stating 'Easter March Hamburg—Bergen-Hohne' walked protesters in mackintoshes with more banners and posters, all in yellow and black, followed by two to three cars, mostly for carrying the baggage (see Figure 2, p. 124). Small groups from Bremen, Braunschweig, Hanover, and Göttingen joined the Hamburg contingent. They were mostly part of the pacifist networks around the German Peace Society (*Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*), the conscientious objectors' organization *Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer*, and other groups.⁴⁶ In 1961, the direction of the marches was turned around. Activists now marched from what they called 'death centres' into larger cities.⁴⁷ From 1963, the marches became shorter, and the direction of the marches was reversed to lead into the bigger cities rather than to military bases, the so-called

death centres, in the countryside. This was due to the emphasis on more explicitly political aims that the later organizers had.⁴⁸

The West German marches were not only regional in their general scope, but there were different marches in each region, which converged on one central place, usually a regional military installation, such as Bergen-Hohne or, later, Dortmund. This *Sternmarsch*, the march in the form of a star, showed a very specific understanding of the spatialization of time on demonstration marches, as the separate demonstration routes occupied one temporal location. Some activists also pointed out that it symbolized radiation.⁴⁹ Unlike in Britain, there was no strict marching order with banners denoting professional, local, regional, or national affiliations. Moreover, the slogans had to be approved by the march organizers, and marshals monitored that the agreed slogans were not altered or replaced.⁵⁰ Silence on the marches was not only an expression of solemnity, but also a form of self-policing against 'communist subversion'. Yet, a skiffle group had joined the first march from Hamburg to Bergen-Hohne, and played when the marchers entered the towns, where activists **(p.201)** were served sandwiches and drinks. Subsequently, some activists urged for more fantasy and colour in a world of cold war apathy and in order to attract more people.⁵¹

These regulations concerning the marching order and the slogans were as much a result of self-policing as of police restrictions: on several marches, the police confiscated slogans on suspicion of communist subversion. Occasionally, during the following years, the police prohibited certain routes and confiscated banners, only some of which had been prohibited in advance.⁵² On one of the marches in the Ruhr area, the police also prohibited the singing of certain songs, as the authorities regarded them as too polemical for an Easter weekend. Yet the marchers continued by whistling them.⁵³ While British political culture was characterized by a similarly high degree of anti-communism, it rarely entailed any practical consequences, a fact of which West German commentators were acutely aware.⁵⁴

West German activists also sought to convey an image of almost forced leisureliness in order to distance themselves from the military tradition of marching.⁵⁵ Indeed, British cartoons even made fun of this marching tradition by showing two CND activists kicked in their backs by a tall, blond, goose-stepping activist behind them: 'Our foreign friends are wonderfully committed, but I wish I did not march in front of the German contingent.'⁵⁶

The marchers slept in barns, public gymnasia, and youth centres on the way. As in Britain, the group held meetings in all larger towns and distributed leaflets with details about the impact of nuclear-bomb explosions along the route. Very few people turned up to these meetings and gatherings, and there were, as in Britain, frequent accusations from bystanders of communist subversion, acts that the Easter March organizers described **(p.202)** as 'defamation', a concept

whose implications were well known to Germans who had lived during National Socialism.⁵⁷ At times, the marchers found barns or restaurants closed although accommodation or meals had been promised. There was usually a makeshift Easter service on the way on Easter Sunday.⁵⁸ Marching through rainy and cold weather over Easter served as a symbol for the marchers' commitment and turned the marches almost into secular pilgrimages for a reawakening.⁵⁹ Often, astonishment dominated immediate reactions to the marches, as 'a phantasmagorical train of people, reminiscent of a medieval procession of flagellants against the plague in a Bergman film', walked past them.⁶⁰ In rare instances, West German protesters faced counter-demonstrations that ended violently. An earlier protest of the Campaign against Atomic Death in Dortmund in June 1958 ended with a knife attack by a CDU member on the driver of the speaker van and with criminal damage to the van's tyres.⁶¹

On the final rally of the first march in Bergen-Hohne, on Easter Monday, around 800 people gathered. Here, close to the site of the former concentration camp Bergen-Belsen, the organizers made several speeches linking a potential future nuclear and the previous Holocaust.⁶² The emotions on the first march ran so high that many marchers had tears in their eyes when they arrived in Bergen-Hohne.⁶³ In subsequent years, the Easter Marches also ended on Easter Monday with final rallies, often, from 1961 onwards, with guest speakers from abroad. Especially the German Trade Union Federation (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)*) was concerned about the date. Its organizers feared that trade unionists' involvement in Easter rallies would have a negative impact on turnout during May Day rallies, a problem that, they believed, did not exist in Britain, as there were no May Day celebrations there.⁶⁴

(p.203) From 1961 onwards, there were marches across West Germany, in the north, in the west, in the south-west, and in the south-east. While they now usually ended in larger cities, such as Hamburg, Munich, or Dortmund, they kept their decentralized character. This not only had to do with West German federalism, but it also reflected the fact that there was, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, still no accepted central place of protest in West Germany, such as Westminster, Whitehall, and Hyde Park in London, or the Mall in Washington. Many still regarded only Bonn as the provisional capital. Conditions in Berlin were not conducive to protests either. Because of fears of communist subversion, rules were particularly strict there.⁶⁵

The marches also appealed to regional political traditions and sites of memory. The Bavarian march, for example, went past the Dachau concentration camp and frequently carried the distinctive Bavarian flag with the white and blue diamonds. The marches in the Ruhr area were influenced much more by the labour-movement traditions than the marches in the south and north. Here, as in Hesse, groups such as the 'Socialist Youth: Falcons', or the youth organizations of the Friends of Nature played an important role in the public presentation of

the marches. Music was very prominent, especially jazz, skiffle, and folk. From the mid-1960s, the Easter Marches often became sights for political cabaret festivals.⁶⁶

While the first rally was attended by only a few hundred people, in 1961 about 23,000 people participated in the final Easter March rallies across the Federal Republic. In 1962, a report to the East German government identified 'marching columns' as long as three kilometres in the Western marches. By 1964, more than 100,000 in the whole of Germany took part.⁶⁷ Possible police reactions and the legal implications constrained the marches in both countries: Britain was no less restrictive than West Germany. Activists in both countries were under strict instructions to follow the demands of the police and the stewards immediately and unquestioningly. Stewards were required by law.⁶⁸ In West Germany, organizers drew special attention to the 'rules of assembly', which set great store by the formal correctness of the marches and, in particular, demanded that music on the marches be declared in advance.⁶⁹

(p.204) At times, local and regional West German police authorities prohibited slogans calling politicians 'murderers'. But activists reacted by mocking the police's decision and covering the original slogans with the words 'This slogan has been banned.' Joking about the police was, in general, quite widespread.⁷⁰ Very popular was chanting 'The police is always with us' to the tune of a nursery rhyme.⁷¹ At times, local and regional police authorities refused to grant permission to march alongside federal roads and past barracks.⁷² A 1961 report by the police authorities in North Rhine Westphalia complained of the disruptions of the Easter holiday caused by 'demonstrating people chanting and singing' and regretted that the march

did not make a good impression on ordinary citizens. The participants, who walked partly barefoot and had young children and toddlers in prams full of luggage with them, gave a very undisciplined picture. Participating dogs, carrying blankets with the rune of death, and the participants' behaviour during breaks—they slept on the ground—completed a picture which was in contrast to the solemnity of the Easter holidays.⁷³

The surveillance and policing of the British marches were quite similar to those of the West German authorities. Permission to stage public marches in London was not granted by the Metropolitan Police Authority, but by the Ministry of Works. In 1958, Whitehall barred the Aldermaston marchers from holding an orderly rally on government-controlled land.⁷⁴ Like their West German counterparts, CND activists were occasionally fined for 'obstructing traffic'.⁷⁵ This was a key site of debate about identifying the marches as political actors: it symbolized the struggle for power between the marchers' chronology of the Easter weekend and that of the public authorities. In both countries, the police or the secret services occasionally photographed the marchers, actions that the

German *Spiegel* likened to snipers (*in Heckenschützenmanier*) as it appeared constantly to fix the protesters' identities.⁷⁶

(p.205) Most of the British government's regulatory activity was, however, directed against the Committee of 100 (C100) rather than CND.⁷⁷ In September 1961, for example, the British government denied the Committee the use of Trafalgar Square. When C100 activists staged a sit-down nonetheless, almost a thousand people, including Bertrand Russell, were arrested under the Defence of the Realm Act.⁷⁸ After the 1963 campaign, organized by some activists of the C100, which exposed the top-secret Regional Seats of Government, a *Peace News* issue reporting on the incident was censored, and the activists were charged under the Official Secrets Act.⁷⁹

The pictures of the marches in the national press displayed images that showed respect for state power until the end of the 1950s. Protests thus appeared limited to certain points of the year and to certain localities. Only at the beginning of the 1960s did confrontational pictures return to the West German media with regard to the Easter Marches and other protests: the police was shown carrying protesters away.⁸⁰ The West German media interpreted these pictures with a cultural code similar to the one they had used to describe the riots of mostly working-class youth (*Halbstarke*). In Britain, the conflicts of state authorities with 'Mods' and 'Rockers' formed the reference point.⁸¹

Significantly, despite the mass media attention they received, the radical activists remained a fringe group in Britain. Significantly, the Committee's anti-statist rhetoric, which singled out the violence of the British state, did not sound plausible in the British context. The observation of the C100's activities in West Germany, by contrast, often via conferences organized by the War Resisters' International, helped West German activists to rediscover their own national protest traditions.⁸²

(p.206) Protest events

Throughout the first phase of the West German movement, the Campaign against Atomic Death, the polarization between marchers and public had been far less pronounced. The dominant form of protest was the mass rally and meeting, rather than the march, and, through the links to the *SPD* and trade unions, the protesters remained directly connected to institutionalized politics.⁸³ The geographical distribution of the Campaign's protests thus reflected the strength of local labour-movement traditions, with peaks of activity in the area around Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and the Ruhr area as well as the southern areas of North-Rhine Westphalia. These forms of protests required far less commitment and could be much more tightly regulated and controlled by the organizers. The duration of the protests was rather short, the structure had clearly been outlined by the organizers, and, unlike in the Easter Marches, the supporters mostly acclaimed announcements.⁸⁴

This was in tune with the *SPD*'s traditions, but also sought to appeal to a distinctly middle-class audience. At the opening ceremony of the Campaign against Atomic Death in the Frankfurt Congress Centre, the Frankfurt Youth Symphony Orchestra and a Frankfurt choral society played classical music. The speeches also sought to convey an image of solemnity and humanitarian pathos.⁸⁵ The whole ceremony was reminiscent of the Paulskirche movement against German rearmament from the mid-1950s in which the *SPD* had taken part less visibly.⁸⁶

After the launch of the Campaign, local rallies, usually endorsed by the *SPD* and the trade unions, took place. Particularly noteworthy were several demonstrations at factories in Bielefeld, a short strike by Hamburg dock workers (probably organized by communists), and a silent march through Hamburg's city centre.⁸⁷ In Berlin, the Falcon group staged what was probably the first sit-down in the history of the Federal Republic by blocking the tramways in the city centre.⁸⁸ Several thousand workers also went on strike in the Wolfsburg and Braunschweig *Volkswagen* factories.⁸⁹ **(p.207)** The threat of 'communist subversion' and the desire to keep the upper hand in the local protests led to discussions between the trade unions and the *SPD* whether to advocate a general strike against nuclear armaments.⁹⁰ While Menzel and the *SPD* headquarters continued to push for at least a short symbolic strike action in the run-up to NATO's conference in Copenhagen in May 1958, the *DGB* was loath to commit itself formally to a strike: it feared a break-up of its Christian-orientated trade union branches which officially supported Adenauer's policies.⁹¹

Apart from the marches and demonstrations, activists in both countries staged other more limited protests in order to maintain the campaigns' momentum. They were mostly concerned with occupying specific dates for public commemorations. Prominent examples included Hiroshima Day on 6 August and Anti-War Day on 1 September, the latter also held in the GDR. These usually took the form of vigils, and often copied official ceremonies, such as wreath-laying at war memorials in Britain, or processions with torches through the city centres in West Germany.⁹² Many German anti-war-day protests were gatherings at concentration-camp sites, such as Dachau and Bergen-Belsen.⁹³ At times, these vigils also entailed carrying black wooden crosses.⁹⁴ In Britain, activists did not stage wreath-layings on 1 September, but they reappropriated Remembrance Sunday for their anti-war protests. They staged wreath-layings at the local cenotaphs, interpreting the memory of war as an anti-war message.⁹⁵

1 September was quite contentious as a day of memory in the Federal Republic. The majority of the population still remembered, in line with Nazi propaganda, 3 September 1939—the day when Britain declared war on Germany—as the outbreak of war, and not 1 September—the day when Germany invaded Poland. Moreover, the communist World Peace Council had proclaimed 1 September as 'World Peace Day' in the early 1950s, which discredited the date further in West

German public debates. Yet trade union youth associations introduced the anti-war day into the Easter Marches' reservoir of protest from around 1961 onwards, starting in the area around Frankfurt/Main and Offenbach. In 1962, a report to **(p.208)** the *DGB* counted 5,962 participants at events in 282 *DGB* districts.⁹⁶ In order to control and steer the events, the *DGB* actively endorsed the events from 1964 onwards.⁹⁷ It aimed at in-door events in trade-union buildings that had an educational character and involved discussion with experts, the showing of films, such as *The Bridge (Die Brücke)*, by Bernhard Wicki) and *All Quiet on the Western Front*, as well as readings from anti-war literature.⁹⁸

While experiences of marching were often very individual, many of the protests came to have a transnational dimension as well. 'Transfer' or 'diffusion' of specific concepts mattered less in this respect than common emotions and belonging. The observation among the activists that they were not alone and that they were united by a common cause when marching together was fundamentally important. Activists imposed their own timing on the Easter weekend across Western Europe, and the exchange of marchers between Britain, West Germany, and other countries demonstrated this.⁹⁹ The moral rhetoric of a world community and human brotherhood was the expression of this feeling. Internationalized marches 'gave a powerful impression of solidarity and unity without much conscious liaison having been attempted'.¹⁰⁰ Activists thus performed the world community they strove to create.¹⁰¹ As one of the speakers at a War Resisters' International (WRI) conference elaborated: 'Co-operation works best on the basis of action rather than that of the exchange of ideas or on the day-to-day work.'¹⁰² Although there were isolated instances of peace marches beyond borders, they never attracted any major press coverage and resonance.¹⁰³ **(p.209)**

Signs of belonging

Activists expressed solidarity not only through their actions, but also through the symbols they used. It was through the exchange of delegations and marchers as well as through the journals of the national peace movements that the universally recognized symbol found its way into peace campaigns around the world and turned the experience of community and fellowship into something that could be easily identified. It was used by the protesters to




Figure 4. CND symbol

assure themselves of a common cause in a world that they perceived as antagonistic. The sign (see Figure 4), developed by the artist Gerhard Holtom, showed the semaphoric N and D (for Nuclear Disarmament), surrounded by a circle.

The sign replaced the white dove on a blue background that had been used by the communist-sponsored peace movements since the late 1940s as the main symbol of peace activism in the late 1950s and early 1960s. With its straightforward and highly abstract character, it was supposed to convey the message of rationality and objectivity. Even the material out of which badges were manufactured was chosen accordingly.¹⁰⁴ The symbol was, at times, made out of 'natural material' such as clay, to symbolize the campaign's holistic character. The more radical C100 used badges and banners which showed a white CND symbol on a red background, thus demonstrating C100's belief in revolutionary social change.¹⁰⁵ The West German Easter Marches produced a badge that resembled the tags that soldiers carried.

Movement activists interpreted the symbol alternatively as an 'unborn child', as a bent cross symbolizing the 'death of man', or even as a 'rune (p.210)

of death', an interpretation preferred by many Germans.¹⁰⁶ The CND symbol could be found on West German Easter Marches from 1961 onwards. It found its way onto flyers and pamphlets from about 1962 or 1963 onwards.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, the demonstrators in both countries would carry posters that were kept entirely in black and white to show the seriousness of the situation.¹⁰⁸ One activist criticized the choice of symbols. While he (p.211) drew attention to the importance of 'propaganda techniques' in order to win over 'the most primitive people', he regretted that 'our symbol is more about death than about life', while Hitler had chosen the 'positive sun wheel' to advertise his message.¹⁰⁹ The SPD-run campaign, concentrating primarily on mass meetings, had not developed its own symbol, but




Figure 5. Poster, Campaign against Atomic Death, June 1958: 'Think about yourself and yours. Therefore: No to Atomic Death. Three times no!' (Courtesy

adopted Albert Schweitzer's head instead (see Fig. 5).¹¹⁰

It is striking, however, that the British and the West German campaign used primarily

of AdsD, 6/PLKA006493, poster by Ernst Jupp)

abstract images or the power of

personalities who were regarded as leaders in morality to convey their message. The leaflets that both campaigns distributed, and the posters they had designed, used the traditional modernist form of political campaigning, as Benjamin Ziemann has highlighted: they listed facts and figures, often contrasting the 'wrong' view of their respective government with their own 'right views' and using scientific information and statistics to underline the rationality of their claims.¹¹¹

Security as 'normality'

Much of the power of protest marches lies in the display of strength through the assembly of a large number of bodies. In protest marches, the physical body also becomes a symbolic representation of the social body, and concerns about social order become translated into concerns about bodily control. Rather than entirely transcending dominant connections between gender and emotions, they still replicated elements of the dominant gender regime. They did not show their strength as the male 'virility' of soldiers. Instead, male and female protesters displayed tuned-down emotions that tapped discourses of rational (male) citizenship.

There was an emotionally restrained body politic on the move. While political and social scientists until the late 1960s regarded emotions as a key to understanding all political actions, the British and West German activists themselves denied their emotions. Instead, they claimed the rationality of their cause, an aspect that both governments were quite concerned about, as it made their task for excluding the movements from respectable politics more difficult.¹¹² Mervyn Jones pointed out: 'This is a **(p.212)** campaign that urges people to reflect, not to destroy; to march a silent mile, not to shout; to dissent, not to obey; to be themselves, not to take sides; to love, not to hate; to live and let others live, not to kill or die.'¹¹³

Although women took part in the demonstrations and thus shared in this demonstration of citizenship, internal documents highlight how male activists did not treat women as equally legitimate rational citizens: women were confined to duties that were connoted female, such as typing leaflets, cooking, and nuts-and-bolts organizing, but most women were not allowed to *voice* their claims to citizenship by participating in discussions or giving speeches on the marches.¹¹⁴

By framing their emotions in this way, the protesters tapped and replicated two discourses. First, they sought to counter accusations that they undermined the

very security they wished to create by taking their cause to the streets, as the cold war consensus connoted street politics primarily with 'communist agitation'.¹¹⁵ Second, they sought to contradict possible accusations, familiar after the First World War, that their 'female' emotions endangered national security.¹¹⁶

For the majority of protesters, 'security' was the re-creation of order on the marches. Restraint and control were the key words in both countries. While the governments accused the protesters of overly emotional and unreasonable behaviour, the activists highlighted their rationality and reason against the government's atomic 'madness'.¹¹⁷ 'One can', wrote the Protestant priest Heinrich Vogel, 'if one is a citizen of a divided fatherland, take the map and say once again: 'atomic armament of German forces—I speak candidly -: crime, madness.'¹¹⁸ They also pointed to the 'nervous character' of the age and demanded a 'relaxation' (*Entspannung*) of tensions.¹¹⁹ Conversely, activists frequently compared nuclear **(p.213)** armaments to unthinking and essentially irrational 'child's play'.¹²⁰ Instead of transcending the British and West German governments' emphasis on 'normality', the activists merely turned the logic around and claimed that their governments were fearful and irrational. The CND highlighted the emphasis on rationality by naming its journal *Sanity*.¹²¹

Most activists in both countries demonstrated their own individual emotional control, whereas they discussed the nuclear arms race under the rubric of 'atomic madness', 'insanity', and other concepts that signified the loss of rational control.¹²² Even those protesters who favoured non-violent direct action stressed their self-control and their endurance to withstand constant recriminations and the use of violence by the police. As Pat Arrowsmith pointed out: 'I must not provoke violence. Violence must be seen to be done to me.'¹²³

The protesters not only tried to show their emotional restraint in words. The vigils that the protesters held demonstrated this restraint: they showed a small number of activists holding posters or banners, and carrying candles or, in West Germany, torches. During these vigils, both British and West German activists demonstrated against the acceleration of time that they saw during the series of international crises in the late 1950s and early 1960s: over Berlin in winter 1958–59, again in August 1961, and over Cuba in autumn 1962.¹²⁴ Interestingly, there were no significant differences between arguments that the British and West German movements used to describe these crises, and the fundamental message conveyed did not change over time. Nor were there significant differences in which events they designated to be 'critical'.

The symbolic meanings of their reactions to crises were rather paradoxical; the protesters framed the events as 'crisis' and thus accelerated the feeling of time, yet they simultaneously employed vigils as symbolized attempts to slow down time. This mechanism was unique in creating a community among protesters, as

the call for community, rationality, and **(p.214)** calm addressed Christian and humanist voices alike.¹²⁵ Vigils thus both symbolized the need for security through stabilization and served as a strategy for the activists themselves to control their emotions.

In both countries, the emotional economies during times of crisis had three directly connected elements. First, protesters in both countries framed these crises, through a constant seam of leafletting and through reporting in the movement press, not as events but as processes that could either run out of hand and result in nuclear warfare, or be contained and controlled. Second, by staging vigils across their countries (rather than in the capital only), they gave these crises a concrete geographical location in the middle of the community in which they protested. Even West German protesters staged very few vigils in Berlin, the centre of two international crises during this time period, as police restrictions on demonstrations were particularly harsh there.¹²⁶ Third, the protesters used the vigil to slow down the fast-paced historical processes and symbolize the need for calm and rationality in an age of accelerated time. Conversely, the activists accused politicians of looking for 'quick solutions' and 'being out of control'.¹²⁷

There were, however, differences in the forms the activists used to convey the message of a calm and controlled emotional economy. The Campaign against Atomic Death used prominent politicians and theologians to demonstrate for calm and rational decisions in Germany's capital Bonn as well as in regional capitals; they held torches, thus tapping the code of the memory of war.¹²⁸

Many local groups of the Campaign against Atomic Death and of the Easter Marches, by contrast, sought to convey the message of calm in a more casual setting, while they still maintained sobriety and absolute silence as a symbol for self-control and rationality. Pacifists around Tempel had become acquainted with the more casual form of vigil during their visits to Britain.¹²⁹

Only a small minority of protesters in Britain, mostly from within the C100 and the DAC, sought to transcend these restrained emotional **(p.215)** economies by accelerating time and by urging for a rapid decision in favour of 'peace'. Instead of holding vigils, they staged sit-downs in front of embassies, most famously in front of the Soviet and American embassies in London during the Cuban missile crisis. For them, security was no longer connected to an urge to achieve stability. Instead, they highlighted the need for socio-economic changes and movement in order to achieve a long-lasting 'peace' and stability. This is illustrated by the symbolic action of two radical pacifists during the Cuban missile crisis. Pat Arrowsmith and Wendy Butlin staged a 'flight to Ireland' in order to survive nuclear war on the Irish west coast.¹³⁰ Here, the strategy to achieve personal security from nuclear attack converged with the desire to maintain movement.

Marches and other forms of protest thus became symbols of the wish for the normalization and pacification of each society after the war, in which the natural order of things was restored.¹³¹ The media, by contrast, sought to find what they regarded as moral degeneration on the marches. Trying to prove rumours of sexual laxity, one British tabloid sent a shabbily dressed female student to the 1963 march in the hope that she would be importuned—an attempt that remained entirely unsuccessful.¹³² In West Germany, we can find many of the same themes in the reporting on the Easter Marches, but they were usually brought together under the coding ‘communist subversion’. Thus, illicit sex became not only a danger to morality, but also an important factor in weakening the West German body politic vis-à-vis the East. Beard-wearing youngsters were thus deemed dangers to public order, which, in turn, would lead to communist subversion.¹³³

From a social-historical perspective, the appeals to rationality reflected the specific emotional economy of the middle classes and not least the strong nonconformist presence on the marches.¹³⁴ Moreover, by displaying self-control, restraint, and rationality, the protesters redefined military **(p.216)** notions of masculinity by showing non-violent restraint, peaceful comradeship, and domesticated fatherhood.¹³⁵

Although the protesters in both countries displayed the same themes of an emotionally controlled body politic on the move, these emotional economies had very specific national resonances and functions. In Britain, the emotional economies of restraint met accusations, most famously by Aneurin Bevan at the 1957 Labour Party conference, that nuclear disarmament was the expression of ‘an emotional spasm’.¹³⁶ The protesters’ emotional economies coincided with the image of austerity that was common in British political culture in response to the war years. Rationality and emotional control played an important role in debates within the British labour movement, on the left and on the right.¹³⁷ Restraint on the marches also reflected an emphasis on moral seriousness, earnestness, and rationality as key characteristics of masculinity embodied by liberal Christian gentlemen.¹³⁸

Most importantly, however, the emotional economies of restraint in Britain tapped the specific version of British national identity that had emerged in response to the violence of the First World War and that interpreted British society as a ‘peaceable kingdom’. Since the 1920s, the civility of extra-parliamentary protests in Britain had become a central argument for their legitimacy. According to this view, public opinion was understood as sober, unassertive, and domestic. It found its expression in the 1936 Public Order Act, still valid in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which allowed a police officer to demand the name of anyone judged to be disrupting a meeting. The Act standardized the law relating to threatening and insulting behaviour likely to cause the breach of peace.¹³⁹ Acting in accordance with these views guaranteed

a high degree of support across British society. For example, when the police ordered Oxford student Richard Wallace to stop selling *Peace News* in Oxford, he was **(p.217)** defended in court by the young Tory politician Jonathan Aitken, who emphasized the importance of freedom of expression.¹⁴⁰

While some of these sources were present among West German protesters as well, the emphasis on 'rationality' tapped an at once narrower and broader strand of public discourse. It went to the core of West Germany's 'anti-totalitarian' consensus. In the Federal Republic, extra-parliamentary politics could easily be represented as a revival of National Socialist marches or as results of communist subversion. Indeed, despite the restrained emotional economies, some remnants of these traditions were still visible. The protesters' vocabulary continued to draw on military terms such as *Einsatzgruppen* and *Trupps* to refer to specific sections. And West German activists did not use the term 'steward' or 'Ordner' but the military term 'Ordonanz' (for ordinance officer).¹⁴¹

Their emphasis on rationality helped the activists to distance themselves from both National Socialism and Communism as well as the street politics of the Weimar Republic. Both within general public discourse and among movement supporters, emotions remained connected to communist or foreign 'guest workers'. 'Jazz music' in particular, used as a synonym for all kinds of musical styles beyond the mainstream repertoire, appeared to suggest an uncontrolled sexuality. Sexual licentiousness and exuberance were, during the 1950s and early 1960s, also associated with National Socialism.¹⁴²

The protesters of the first Easter Marches in northern Germany tried to achieve normalization through 'silent discipline' on the marches. On the early marches, protesters emphasized their 'correct' and 'normal' clothing.¹⁴³ Such emphasis on 'objectivity' (*Sachlichkeit*) also served as a crucial way of distancing the protesters from the Nazi past.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, many **(p.218)** pictures taken from the Campaign against Atomic Death and Easter March rallies show activists in jacket and ties.¹⁴⁵ Some protest marches had also carried banners with the slogan 'No experiments!', thus using Adenauer's 1957 election slogan against his government's policies.¹⁴⁶ The campaigns' posters often used black and white, or black and orange colours, in order to convey the message soberly. From 1963-64, however, the cultural code started to change. There now emerged a very peculiar mixture of information, and more dramatic forms, such as political cabaret or humorous stunts.¹⁴⁷ The Munich-based German section of the Situationist International mocked this emphasis on rationality and calmness in its leaflet on 'Calmness of Nerves! No Experiments!'¹⁴⁸

Particularly in the Ruhr area, the marches became increasingly colourful, with folk music and skiffle groups taking part.¹⁴⁹ The British occupation forces had introduced folk and skiffle in the Ruhr area, both as part of their

democratization efforts and as part of the soldiers' lifestyles.¹⁵⁰ Some Easter March activists had become involved in the local folk scene, which produced its own artists, such as Fasia Jansen and Dieter Süverkrüpp, and which later began to attract singers from outside the Federal Republic, such as Joan Baez and Pete Seeger.¹⁵¹ As in the United States and Britain, folk music offered the activists a particularly good opportunity to establish links with 'the people' and present themselves as home-grown movements.¹⁵² Some West German activists also wanted to reconsider the length of the marches: they claimed that four days were too demanding and discouraged potential participants.¹⁵³ Others did not want the marches to be manifestations of sombre mourning, but instead to show, particularly through music, signs of life.¹⁵⁴ Others complained, however, that music would ridicule the 'earnest' character of the march and wished to maintain **(p.219)** the endurance need to march for four or five days over the Easter weekend as a crucial indication of the marches' integrity.¹⁵⁵

Practising citizenship

By marching on the Easter weekend, the protesters cast themselves both as possible future victims of governmental policies that would lead to death and destruction and as enlightened pilgrims who sacrificed their Easter weekend for the cause of democracy and humanity. Their own fate, that of democracy, and that of humanity became inextricably linked in a moment of hope, collective rebirth, and transformation. For the activists, the movements themselves thus became instruments for creating moral subjects who transcended the dominant mode of contemporary citizenship, which acted mainly through parliaments, parties, and elections.¹⁵⁶ Activists in both countries often regarded their protests as a 'duty'. Britons thereby echoed Victorian ideals of character, duty, and service in the context of their campaign.¹⁵⁷ West Germans, in part, had translated such ideals into the context of their own campaigns when engaging with British campaign literature. But these could also tap notions of liberal citizenship that held that individual rights derived from social membership and were directly related to service to a common good.

While both movements were quite similar in their endeavours to re-define citizenship, their notions of civic responsibility had very different implications in each national context. The marchers' concepts of citizenship combined political status with a set of social practices and thus turned the marches into 'a site of intense struggle' about civic activism.¹⁵⁸

The ideal of citizenship on British marches harked back to ideals first expressed by New Liberalism at the beginning of the twentieth century and then again in the Second World War that had created a 'characteriological narrative of war' where civic commitment was demonstrated **(p.220)** through the good character of enduring hardship. Here, citizenship was both a brave and quiet heroism and

a sacrifice of private and personal interests for a global public collective good in times of general political apathy.¹⁵⁹

While the West German activists highlighted the same themes, they linked them less to a possible national regeneration and more to the enactment of democracy and thus to Germany's most recent history. This democracy had, they claimed, become stale under the dominant anti-communist consensus and was in danger of reverting to a totalitarian mode. More than their British counterparts, they emphasized the importance of individual resistance against 'the state'. This scepticism towards state authority revealed profound feelings of injury after the experience of the last war, when they bemoaned the dominance of 'military norms of security' in German public life.¹⁶⁰ Marching over Easter thus became an enactment of both security and West German democracy. This kind of thinking found expression in the slogan 'Our "No!" to the Bomb, is a "Yes!" to Democracy'.¹⁶¹

Exercising one's civic duty through marching could itself change the course of history, expressed in the German slogan 'better active than radioactive': protesters empowered themselves with agency by calling themselves 'active' and thus creating a new form of subjectivity.¹⁶² One of the main CND songs, also sung on German marches, elaborated how such an involvement might matter by asking:

Shall we lay the world in ruin?
Only you can make the choice.
Stop and think of what you're doing.
Join the march and raise your voice.¹⁶³

(p.221) A CND leaflet elaborated on this activist message: 'There are some things you have to do whether you are likely to succeed or not ... It is the millions who say: "It is no use, nothing to do with me", who are responsible for the fact that there are still nuclear weapons in the world.'¹⁶⁴ In the Federal Republic, such claims resonated with experiences of West Germany's most recent past. Through civic activism, the protesters hoped to urge German society to end its 'holiday from history'. They evoked at once Germany's most recent past and expressed the wish to overcome it through civic activism.¹⁶⁵

The small minority of activists in Britain and in the Federal Republic who favoured non-violent direct action radicalized this voluntaristic conception of citizenship and thus sought to collapse the boundary between protesters and observers.¹⁶⁶ They invaded RAF rocket sites in East Anglia in early 1961 and staged a sit-down in front of the Ministry of Defence in February and on Trafalgar Square in April 1961.¹⁶⁷ On the 1963 Aldermaston March, C100 activists tried to occupy the top-secret regional seats of government in their 'Spies for Peace' campaign, releasing maps with the precise locations and phone numbers of these underground bunkers that were to serve as government

locations in case of nuclear war.¹⁶⁸ West German protesters replicated military notions of masculinity in non-violent ways by founding a 'non-violent civic army' (composed mainly of men) in the Stuttgart area to express their opposition to conscription and nuclear weapons: 'ruthless fighting' until the very end had now been replaced by the *konsequent*, the consequential, forceful, and consistent 'deployment' (*Einsatz*) for non-violence.¹⁶⁹

(p.222) By using their bodies to claim civic rights, they implied that, in the absence of transcendental and national bonds, only the body remained as the last security. Consequently, the citizenship injured through nuclear weapons policies could be healed only through a thorough reform of life in small communities, at the military bases as well as in small communes. For many activists, citizenship, life reform, and nuclear weapons thus became intimately connected.¹⁷⁰

Explicitly female claims to citizenship were rare in both the British and West German campaigns. Most of the activists' conceptions of citizenship remained concerned with the abstract individual.¹⁷¹ Only at the beginning of the protests in 1958 and 1959 could we find claims that rooted female activism directly in the 'biological ground of sexual relations and a mother's existential care for the next generation'.¹⁷² Throughout, women in Britain staged campaigns more visibly than their West German counterparts. Peggy Duff recalls that one Aldermaston coach was even nicknamed 'the brothel', in virtue of its female passengers. Crucially, however, like the majority of (particularly older) women who called themselves 'feminist' at the time, CND's women did not feel much sympathy with radical feminism.¹⁷³

One of CND's first demonstrations featured 2,000 women marching in black from London's Hyde Park to Trafalgar Square.¹⁷⁴ The women's group within CND continued to arrange conferences that stressed the 'the genetic dangers which are of such special concern to women'. In autumn 1961, four women with prams led several hundred marchers to the Soviet Embassy in London to protest against the resumption of weapons tests: 'we can't just go on cooking food for our families when we know it is being contaminated with radioactive poisons.'¹⁷⁵ In 1961, Joan Littlewood **(p.223)** put on a CND rally in the London Albert Hall with jazz and political speeches and anti-*Polaris* folk songs, including 'The misguided Missiles and the Misguided Miss'.¹⁷⁶ Interestingly, however, often such gendered versions of citizenship were propagated by both female and male activists, revealing the emergence of specifically domestic versions of masculinity at the time.¹⁷⁷

The forces of conscience

By campaigning for a morally pure version of citizenship, both male and female activists not only displayed, but also reconstructed, moral subjects after the ravages of the Second World War.¹⁷⁸ Marching over the Easter weekend thus

became an important source of the self in two societies in which recent memories of war and expectations of possible nuclear annihilation merged. In order to justify their involvement, the protesters invoked their 'conscience' as their authority. The pacifist Hans-Konrad Tempel argued that conscience 'forced upon' him a 'real democratic consciousness'.¹⁷⁹ 'Conscience' is the classical institution of individual self-observation, 'the inner court' in Immanuel Kant's words. It focuses the decision on the individual rather than on the authority of institutions. It guides individual choice by providing certain interpretations of reality and is an instance of self-observation and self-control. Moreover, according to most Western codes of law, it is only conscience that allows people, in extreme circumstances, to break the law.¹⁸⁰ By emphasizing their subjectivity that could be generalized into public moral norms, the protesters also cast themselves as victims of government policies and thus merged, as survivors, with the past victims of the bombing wars in central Europe **(p.224)** and Japan.¹⁸¹ While the pattern of staging the politics of conscience was quite similar, its political implications differed substantially.

Both movements drew on the example of the 'conscience' of the Hiroshima reconnaissance pilot Major Claude Eatherly and his interview with the philosopher Günther Anders. Anders remarked that it was a promising sign that Eatherly could not come to terms with what had happened: it meant that he was 'able to keep [his] conscience alive, although [he was] switched on to a technical apparatus as part of a machine ...'.¹⁸² In the same vein, after describing radiation injuries, A. J. P. Taylor asked at CND's inaugural meeting: 'Is there anyone here who would want to do this to another human being?'¹⁸³ West German protesters staged their protests even more emphatically as a 'crusade of conscience', showed a slideshow entitled 'conscience at the crossroads', and argued that conscience had to be 'woken up'.¹⁸⁴

The moral economy of conscience also revealed an ethical sensibility that emphasized the composure of the individual.¹⁸⁵ It went to the heart of traditional definitions of *Bürgerlichkeit* or bourgeois values in Germany and Britain: the middle class could claim, with its particular ideas, interests, and universal moral values, to represent humanity as a whole and its general principles. Similarly, such discourse of moral authority and an 'aristocracy of the common weal' cut across the cold war liberal assumptions about the end of class society and of ideology.¹⁸⁶ In Britain, **(p.225)** such arguments found parallels in earlier condemnations of the bombing of German cities.¹⁸⁷

The Marches on Easter weekends thus turned into events that helped placate at once the respective national conscience and the bonds of humanity. British critics of CND and its rhetoric of conscience feared a Germanization of British political culture. The German idea of conscience, following Kantian interpretations, interpreted it as an a priori fact of reason and during the nineteenth century had come to emphasize the pathos of decision.¹⁸⁸ British

political thought, by contrast, had emphasized its social character, stemming from interaction with people within society:

it is clear ... that the Christian conscience does require us to be ready to surrender the political purposes of our nation if the only alternative is intolerable devastation for humanity ... The opportunity for personal martyrdom will remain under whatever political system we live—there is always an opportunity to be ‘dead’ for Christ. But to bring down the world by way of political protest smacks more of *Götterdämmerung* than of Christian witness.¹⁸⁹

In West Germany, such arguments of conscience and moral witness had very specific meanings, which revealed the specific characteristics of the German conscience. These meanings were never monolithic, as activists constantly debated the shape and form the politics of conscience should take. Yet what made the West German discussion special was that ‘bearing witness’ and revealing ‘conscience’ equated past and possible future German victimhood in quasi-religious terms, a trope that also played an important role in the debates about *Wiedergutmachung* in the early to mid-1950s and memories of German bomb warfare.¹⁹⁰

Protesters thus came to connect their own activism against nuclear weapons to West Germany's violent past and its future as a democracy.¹⁹¹ At times, elements of the ‘Nazi conscience’¹⁹² shone through—for example, when one protester argued that the ‘enemies of the people’ (*Volksfeinde*) had to be revealed and ‘their trade’ had to be stopped.¹⁹³ Others (p.226) turned the history of the *Volksgemeinschaft* against Adenauer's government: ‘But it's always the same: whoever warns, is expelled from the community!’¹⁹⁴ Thus, the West German protesters implicitly evoked deeply buried, but present, layers of memory of the bombing war and personal injuries, and they brought them into the public sphere.

Importantly, West German activists, much more than their British counterparts, assumed that conscience was intricately related to guilt and responsibility. West German activists adopted the same language used to describe the German resistance against Hitler.¹⁹⁵ Conversely, protesters believed, like Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich in their book about ‘the inability to mourn’, that individual conscience has lost critical function during the Third Reich because of general obedience to Hitler.¹⁹⁶ They thus turned themselves *ex post* into resisters who redeemed German guilt, yet constituted themselves as victims, this time not of National Socialism and allied bombing, but of their own government. The idea was that the protesters could detach themselves, like the resisters, from German guilt through a subjective act.¹⁹⁷

While conscience had remained confined to the private sphere in the immediate post-war years, West German activists now used it as a public argument and thus contradicted especially those who believed that only public silence could provide the environment for penance.¹⁹⁸ They claimed the identity of human personality and citizen. Thus, protesters explicitly contradicted one of the central elements on which modern statehood depended: the Hobbesian ideas that conscience was nothing but a subjective, private opinion and that personality and citizenship were two distinct phenomena.¹⁹⁹

(p.227) Those Germans who had not been able to bear their conscience and to deal with defeat in 1945 had committed suicide. West German activists, in particular, connected their appeals to conscience with images of 'mass suicide', yet they did not explore the implications in more detail. It is no coincidence that West German protesters were especially keen to refer to nuclear armaments as leading to collective 'suicide'.²⁰⁰

Accordingly, the Protestant clergyman Heinrich Grüber, a supporter of the West German campaign, reported the impressions of a doctor who had survived Auschwitz and now worked in Albert Schweitzer's mission in Lambarene: 'Germans will, with the same perfection with which they have prepared and used the final solution for the Jews, prepare, execute, or permit the final solution of its own people.' As during the Third Reich, 'a group of knowing people now prepare things, while others watch; if Germans don't turn round, they will follow the men whom they once so adored and thus show the way from mass murder to mass suicide.'²⁰¹ Activists also drew on the memory of such acts when talking about 'nuclear suicide' and linked it to overcoming the cold war mindset: The 'romantic motto ... "better dead than red" [in the original: "besser tot als Sklav"]', they argued, replicated Hitler's policies, as 'he had drawn innumerable people into the spell of his desperate mentality'.²⁰²

British protesters also alluded to the theme of 'nuclear suicide', but they linked it much more directly to specific political issues and their distrust in political leaders. For example, CND criticized Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home's statement that Britain was prepared to be blown to dust over Berlin by wondering: 'What right does Sir Alec have to decide that we should all turn into atomic dust with him?'²⁰³ In general, British activists used abstract arguments rather rarely and restricted themselves to critiques of affluent society. Typical of the latter interpretation is Doris Lessing's despair at the 'blind forces of modern civilisation': 'Exhausted with the pressure of living, each of us might say "Oh for God's sake, press the button, turn down the switch, we've all had enough."'²⁰⁴

(p.228) Critics of CND, even nonconformists, argued, by contrast, that, when religious values themselves were at stake, it was a Christian duty to defend them: 'it would be better for nations to be wiped out than that they should submit to be morally murdered by the poison of Communist totalitarianism.'²⁰⁵

Tapping CND's rhetoric of suicide, but comparing CND to the PPU's support for appeasement in the 1930s, the Bishop of Willesden claimed that 'nuclear war might lead to the destruction of humanity and destroy us all, and therefore it is virtual suicide. That is the risk, a terrible risk, and we have to face it. We also have to face what ... is equally suicide and that is exposing the world to the most diabolical thing the world has ever seen.'²⁰⁶

Transcendence

Through its absolute and transcendental character, the moral symbolism of the marches had a unique capacity to bring the various strands of the protest movements together. It helped the movements to reduce the complexity of the issues at stake, to relate their claims to their wider visions of society, to legitimate their aims, and, not least, to motivate their supporters. It was also unique in being able to reduce the fundamental insecurities that the protesters feared. By staging the marches as amalgams of victimhood and sacrifice (both expressed by the German word *Opfer*), they connected their own aims to the established patterns for dealing with fears of death, related their cause to 'humankind' and 'sacralized' their community. In that sense, the protests had the equivalent, but politically opposite, function of war memorials.²⁰⁷

They empathized with both the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution and the victims of the bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When they drew on a language of the war crimes tribunals and the metaphors of a universal 'Christian cosmos', Auschwitz and Hiroshima appeared as small steps towards global nuclear annihilation. From this perspective, in the words of the Protestant clergyman Heinrich Vogel, 'Hiroshima [was] more than a gas chamber, it [was] Hell!'²⁰⁸ This equalization of Hiroshima and **(p.229)** Auschwitz could be found in the British context as well, and indeed across the world.²⁰⁹ Rather than being only part of the West German memory landscape, such arguments were part of movement dynamics, as they provided a universal language of victimhood. As such, they were directly connected to the ways in which the activists tried to constitute themselves as political actors. This had a particular meaning in West Germany, however: here, it was effectively an attempt to write themselves into Jewish stories of suffering and thus was at its core an expression of 'Holocaust envy'.²¹⁰

In this interpretation of history, also favoured by fellow-travelling groups in the Federal Republic, 'Eichmann [stood] for Everyman'.²¹¹ The Nazi genocide thus appeared as a problem of humanity, and theological structures were transposed onto history. The individual fate of victims became embedded in the story of human suffering in general.²¹² Such universalization of humanity was part of international discussions and had already become clear with the international success of Anne Frank's *Diary of a Young Girl* (1955), which showed the triumph of universal humanity, art, and spirituality over National Socialist brutality.²¹³

Nuclear weapons policies, then, signified the redoubled potency of mass death: 'We used to call Hitler wicked for killing off the Jews, but Kennedy and Macmillan are much more wicked than Hitler ... We cannot obey the murderers. They are wicked, they are abominable. They are the wickedest people in the story of man ...'.²¹⁴ The marchers had taken on the task of expelling the 'wickedness' from their world, but most of them did not want to tumble its foundations. Instead, they emphasized the ways in which they, as persons, could change the world. The threat of nuclear weapons and the desire for security thus led the protesters to discover their sense of self.

Notes:

(¹) IISG, C100, unsorted collection: 'When the Saints go marching in', Easter March Song booklet, n.d. [c.1961].

(²) Wini Breines, *Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962-1968: The Great Refusal* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1982), 6.

(³) Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge, 2001), 55-6, 322.

(⁴) *Sanity* (October 1961), 2; Rechtsanwalt Dr. Hamann, 'Dürfen Deutsche denken? Das Recht auf Opposition in der Bundesrepublik', *konkret* (February 1962), 5; HIS, TEM 300,03: Circular Herbert Stubenrauch, 28 January 1961; Jens Daniel [i.e. Rudolf Augstein], 'Die Stunde der Opposition', *Friedensrundschau*, 15 (1961), 2-3.

(⁵) *Peace News*, 6 April 1959, 4.

(⁶) Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream*, 68, 72.

(⁷) Klaus Beer, *Auf den Feldern von Ulm: In den wechselnden Winden von Adenauer bis Brandt* (Blaubeuren, 2008), 70-2; Vack, *Das andere Deutschland nach 1945*, 68-72.

(⁸) CND song, 'Don't you Hear the H-Bomb's Thunder?', printed in David Widgery (ed.), *The Left in Britain, 1958-1968* (Harmondsworth, 1976), 99; BLPES, CND/1/4: 'Is it any use?', n.d.; 'Unser Marsch ist eine gute Sache', quoted in Frank Baier, 'Ruhrgebiet—Leben, Kämpfen, Solidarisieren', in Zahn (ed.), *Folk und Liedermacher an Rhein und Ruhr*, 129-93, here 132.

(⁹) Oscar Strobel, Michael Schumann, and Hans Schreiner, 'Der Marsch zum Römerberg—Die Zornigen und die Zahmen—Marschieren oder Diskutieren. Interviews mit den Teilnehmern des Anti-Atom-Schweigemarsches 20. Mai 1958', *Diskus—Frankfurter Studentenzeitung*, 8 (June 1958), F2/F3; *Sanity* (October 1961), 2.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Bernd Weisbrod, 'Medien als symbolische Form der Massengesellschaft: Die medialen Bedingungen von Öffentlichkeit im 20. Jahrhundert', *Historische Anthropologie*, 9 (2001), 270–83, especially 280–1.

⁽¹¹⁾ Beatrix W. Bouvier, 'Es wird kommen der Mai ... Zur Ikonographie des Arbeitermai im Kaiserreich', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 33 (1993), 570–85, here 579; Dieter Rucht, '“Heraus zum 1. Mai!": Ein Protestritual im Wandel', in Rucht (ed.), *Protest in der Bundesrepublik: Strukturen und Entwicklungen* (Frankfurt/Main and New York, 2001), 143–72.

⁽¹²⁾ *pläne* (special Easter March issue, 1962), no pagination.

⁽¹³⁾ Reinhart Koselleck, '“Progress” and “Decline”: An Appendix to the History of Two Concepts', in Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, CA, 2002), 218–35, here 220.

⁽¹⁴⁾ BAK, ZSg. 1 262/1: 'Ostermarsch 63', 10; BAK, ZSg. 1–262/3: *Informationen zur Abrüstung*, 3 (September 1963), 6; BAK, Zsg. 1–214/1: 'Scheidung der Geister und Wege', Hamburg n.d., 4; HIS, TEM 200,03: 'Grundsätze des Ostermarschs der Atomwaffengegner', n.d. [c.1961].

⁽¹⁵⁾ Rudi Dutschke, *Jeder hat sein Leben ganz zu leben. Die Tagebücher 1963–1979*, ed. Gretchen Dutschke (Cologne, 2003), 17.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Cf. Veldman, *Fantasy, the Bomb and the Greening of Britain*, 156–79.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Robert Bolt, 'Do you Speak Nuclear?', *New Statesman*, 24 December 1960; BJL, JS-7: CND Charter, n.d [c.1959].

⁽¹⁸⁾ Gerd Sommer, 'Abendlied zu Ostern', *Liederkorb*, 5 (Mainz, 2001), 1.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Denis Knight, secretary of CND's film and television committee, quoted by Christopher Driver, *The Disarmers*, 58; Editorial, *Peace News*, 6 March 1959, 4; Stuart Hall, 'Peace Politics', *Sanity* (May 1963), 5.

⁽²⁰⁾ Martin Grainger, 'Marching against Britain's Death Factory', *CND Newsletter*, 12 April 1958, 2–6.

⁽²¹⁾ Cf., for example, G. Nitsch, 'Gewaltloser aktiver Widerstand', *Das Argument: Blätter der Westberliner Studiengruppen gegen Atomrüstung*, 11, 12 November 1959, 5.

⁽²²⁾ HStAD, NW308–87, 89: 'Ratschläge für die Teilnehmer des Ostermarschs der Atomwaffengegner', n.d. [c.1961]; Gottfried Wandersleb, 'Polizeiverordnungen gegen Grundgesetz?', *Deutsche Volks Zeitung*, 1 October 1962.

(²³) Hugh Brock papers, J. B. Priestley Library, Commonweal Collection, University of Bradford, Bay D, box 2, folder 'Operation Gandhi. Briefing for main procession', n.d. (c. January 1958).

(²⁴) *Peace News*, 18 April 1958, 5; *Peace News*, 17 April 1959, 3; *Peace News*, 14 April 1961, 5; MRC, MSS 181: Executive Committee, minutes, 28 January 1958; Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream*, 67–8.

(²⁵) *CND Newsletter*, 12 April 1958, 6.

(²⁶) *CND Newsletter* (March 1960), 3.

(²⁷) Mervyn Jones, 'Aldermaston 1958', in John Minnion and Philip Bolsover (eds), *The CND Story: The First Twenty-Five Years of CND in the Words of the People Involved* (London, 1983), 44–5.

(²⁸) Cf. *Peace News* (special issue, Easter 1958), 3.

(²⁹) Cf. the special editions of *Peace News* on Easter 1959, 1960, and 1961.

(³⁰) Cf. Bill Schwarz, '“Claudia Jones and the *West Indian Gazette*”: Reflections on the Emergence of Post-Colonial Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, 14 (2003), 264–85, here 272–3.

(³¹) Jones, *Chances*, 161.

(³²) Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream*, 71.

(³³) *Peace News*, 16 May 1958, 3.

(³⁴) Cf. *Peace News*, 6 March 1959, 4; *Peace News*, 7 March 1958, 2; *Peace News*, 7 April 1961, 1.

(³⁵) Minnion and Bolsover (eds), *CND Story*, 52–5.

(³⁶) Cf. *Peace News*, 6 March 1959, 4.

(³⁷) Jo Richardson, 'Tea for 20,000', in Minnion and Bolsover (eds), *CND Story*, 45–7; Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 42, 57, 77, n. 6.

(³⁸) My argument here is indebted to Sean Scalmer, *Gandhi in the West: The Mahatma and the Rise of Radical Protest* (Cambridge, 2011), 9–72, who consulted and analyzed some of the same source material.

(³⁹) Andrew Oppenheimer, 'Air Wars and Empire: Gandhi and the Search for a Usable Past in Postwar Germany', *Central European History*, 45 (2012), 669–96.

(⁴⁰) *Peace News*, 11 November 1949, 3; *Peace News*, 18 August 1950, 6.

⁽⁴¹⁾ J. B. Priestley Library, University of Bradford, Hugh Brock Papers, Folder 'Pre-Occupation Gandhi': Ethel A. Lewis to Kathleen Rawlins, n.d., stamped 29 January 1951.

⁽⁴²⁾ J. B. Priestley Library, University of Bradford, Direct Action Committee and Committee of 100 papers (April Carter), Bay F, folder 'PPU Non Violence Commission': Non-Violence Commission of the PPU, minutes, 12 December 1951; J. B. Priestley Library, University of Bradford, Hugh Brock Papers, Folder 'Pre-Occupation Gandhi': Kathleen Rawlins to Hugh Brock, 19. December 1951.

⁽⁴³⁾ *Peace News*, 21 March 1952, 8; 1 October 1953, 1; 5 March 1954, 3, 4 July 1952, 5; 24 April 1953, 1; 17 February 1956, 1-2; 24 February 1956, 6.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ J. B. Priestley Library, University of Bradford, untitled leaflet, PPU, London, Operation Gandhi Newsletter, no. 1, n.d., 1.

⁽⁴⁵⁾ Scalmer, *Gandhi*, 206-38.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Bethge, ' "Die Bombe ist böse" ', 359-60.

⁽⁴⁷⁾ Interview with Hans-Konrad Tempel, Ahrensburg (Germany), 18 August 2002.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ Bethge, ' "Die Bombe ist böse" ', 367.

⁽⁴⁹⁾ BA-MA, BW2/20203: 'Ostermärsche in der Bundesrepublik, 1961, Dokumentation und Photos', n.d. [c.1961]; 'Aufruf zum Ostermarsch', 1960; Thomas Ballistier, *Straßenprotest. Formen oppositioneller Politik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Münster, 1996), pp. 41-2.

⁽⁵⁰⁾ HIS, TEM 100,04: 'Kernsätze für die Redner des Ostermarsches der Atomwaffengegner' [n.d., c. autumn 1960].

⁽⁵¹⁾ Hans Konrad and Helga Tempel, 'Berührungsgängste und ihre Auswirkungen beim ersten Ostermarsch 1960', in Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie e.V. (ed.), *Geschichten aus der Friedensbewegung: Persönliches und Politisches*, collected by Andreas Buro (Cologne, 2005), 5-12; Cf. also the debates in *Wir sind jung*, 17 (September 1964), 24-5; *pläne*, 11 (1962), no pagination; IfZ, ED702/7: Minutes of the committee meeting of the regional council south of the Easter Marches, 4 February 1963.

⁽⁵²⁾ HStAD, NW 308-84, 48: Regierungspräsident Arnsberg (Westfalia) to Interior Minister of North Rhine Westphalia, 2 May 1962.

⁽⁵³⁾ HIS, WOL2, Folder 'Ostermarsch 1962, Kreis Mettmann': Report by Gertrud Wolfers about the Easter March 1962, 23 April 1962.

⁽⁵⁴⁾ Hilda von Klenze, 'Brief aus England', *Friedensrundschau*, 17 (1963), 26; Sebastian Haffner, 'Die Deutschen und ihre Kommunisten', *Friedensrundschau*, 17 (1963), 10–11, here 10.

⁽⁵⁵⁾ HIS, WOL2, folder 'Ostermarsch 1963, Kreis Mettmann': 'Ein Schritt genügt heute: Aufruf zum Ostermarsch 1963'.

⁽⁵⁶⁾ Reprinted in 'Gegen die Bombe zu Feld gezogen', *Die Kultur* (May–June 1961), 1.

⁽⁵⁷⁾ Cf. Erich Kuby, 'Aggressive Illusionen', *pläne*, 6–7 (July 1962), 6–8.

⁽⁵⁸⁾ HIS, TEM 200,03: Central Committee, minutes, 6–7 May 1961.

⁽⁵⁹⁾ Hans-Konrad and Helga Tempel, '*...das man da wohnen möge*': *Vision und Erfahrung eines gemeinsamen Lebens* (Bad Pyrmont, 1986), 11.

⁽⁶⁰⁾ Kai Hermann, 'Erfolg und viele Kilometer', *Die Zeit*, 3 April 1964, 1.

⁽⁶¹⁾ AdsD, DGB, Abt. Organisation, 24/2193: 'Telefonat zwischen der CDU-Geschäftsstelle Dortmund und der Polizei-Pressestelle', 26 June 1958.

⁽⁶²⁾ HIS, TEM 100,04: Leaflet for the 1960 Easter March.

⁽⁶³⁾ Andreas Buro, 'Damals in Bergen-Hohne flossen Tränen', in Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie e.V. (ed.), *Geschichten aus der Friedensbewegung: Persönliches und Politisches*, 15–20; AdsD, IG Metall Archives, G1010: 'Arbeitspapier für den Ausschuss "Kampf dem Atomtod" über die politische Funktion und Methodik der Arbeit der Kampagne für Abrüstung', n.d. [c.1964].

⁽⁶⁴⁾ AdsD, IG Metall, G1010: Federation of German Trade Unions circular to all members of the Federal Executive, the executives of the member unions and the district and local committees, 20 June 1961.

⁽⁶⁵⁾ Cf. Andreas W. Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin* (Paderborn, 2003), 159–60.

⁽⁶⁶⁾ HIS, WOL2, Folder 'Ostermarsch 1962, Kreis Mettmann': Report by Gertrud Wolfers about the Easter March 1962 [23 April 1962].

⁽⁶⁷⁾ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 130–43; SAPMO-BArch DY30/IV 2/10.02/224, fo. 286: 'Bericht', 2 May 1962.

⁽⁶⁸⁾ HIS, TEM 100,04: 'Organisationsplan', [n.d., c.1961], 4; HStAD NW 308–87, 90: 'Ratschläge für die Teilnehmer des Ostermarschs der Atomwaffengegner', n.d. [c.1961]; *Isis*, 23 January 1963, 3; *Sanity*, April 1963, 5.

⁽⁶⁹⁾ HIS, TEM 200,03: Central Committee, minutes, 2/3 June 1961, 3.

⁽⁷⁰⁾ HIS, TEM 200,03: Central Committee, minutes, 2/3 June 1962, 5.

- (⁷¹) Kai Hermann, 'Erfolg und viele Kilometer', *Die Zeit*, 3 April 1964, 1.
- (⁷²) HIS, TEM 200,03: Central Committee, 2/3 June 1962, 5.
- (⁷³) HStAD, NW 308-84, 49: Regierungspräsident Arnsberg (Westfalia) to Interior Minister of North Rhine Westphalia, 2 May 1962.
- (⁷⁴) TNA: WORK 16/2067: 'Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament: Assemblies, Demonstrations etc. in Parks' (12 June 1961).
- (⁷⁵) Robert Bolt, *A Matter of Life* (London, 1963), 46.
- (⁷⁶) 'Regen im April', *Der Spiegel*, 5 May 1965, 6-7, here 7; *Peace News*, 1 August 1958, 1.
- (⁷⁷) TNA: CAB 21/6027: 'Security Significance of Membership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and other Unilateralist Organisations' (March 1960); TNA: PREM 11/4284: Activities of the Committee of 100 (May 1962); TNA HO 325/163: material on the C100 Marham RAF base, May 1963.
- (⁷⁸) *The Guardian*, 18 September 1961, 3; Driver, *The Disarmers*, 164.
- (⁷⁹) TNA: DPP 2/3432, DPP 2/3678, and PCOM 9/2208: Material on Michael Randle, Peter Moule, and Helen Allegranza. On the court cases, cf. Driver, *The Disarmers*, 164-70.
- (⁸⁰) Cf. 'Böse Ahnungen', *Der Spiegel*, 24 April 1963, 33-4, and the article on the British 'Spies for Peace' campaign, *Der Spiegel*, 24 April 1963, 70.
- (⁸¹) For Britain, cf. Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (St Albans, 1972). For West Germany, cf. Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und 'Zeitgeist' in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre* (Hamburg, 1995), 177.
- (⁸²) Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 190-269. On the transnational circulation of these ideas, see Holger Nehring, 'National Internationalists: Transnational Relations and the British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, 1957-1964', *Contemporary European History*, 14 (2005), 559-82.
- (⁸³) AdsD, 2/PVAM00007: Draft for a circular, 27 October 1959.
- (⁸⁴) Cf. the map in Kraushaar, *Die Protest-Chronik*, iv. 2514.
- (⁸⁵) AdsD, 2/PVAM00005: Programme of the meeting (March 1958) and the collection of speeches.
- (⁸⁶) For a picture of the solemn character of the opening ceremony, cf. the picture taken of the Frankfurt KdA rally on 3 June 1958; cf. Wolfgang Kraushaar

(ed.), *Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung. Von der Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail 1946-1995*, 2nd edn (3 vols, Hamburg, 1998), i. 134.

(⁸⁷) *Die Welt*, 28 March 1958, 3.

(⁸⁸) Kraushaar, *Die Protest-Chronik*, iii. 1846-7.

(⁸⁹) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 March 1958, 2.

(⁹⁰) *Die Andere Zeitung*, 10 April 1958, 6.

(⁹¹) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 March 1958, 2; *Die Welt*, 1 April 1958, 6; AdsD, DGB, Abt. Organisation, 24-2216: Extract from the minutes of the federal executive, 5 December 1967.

(⁹²) *Sanity* (August 1963), 9; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7 August 1962, 3; 'Kriegsgegner protestieren mit Fackeln', *Mannheimer Morgen*, 3 September 1965.

(⁹³) *Gewerkschaftspost*, 10 (October 1963), 21.

(⁹⁴) HIS TEM 200,03: Central Committee, minutes, 6-7 May 1961.

(⁹⁵) *Sanity* (December 1962), 3; *Sanity* (December 1963), 4.

(⁹⁶) AdsD, DGB, Abt. Organisation, 24/5801: 'Betr. 1. September' [n.d., c.1962].

(⁹⁷) AdsD, DGB, Abt. Org. 24/9005: 'Vorlage für den geschäftsführenden Bundesvorstand', 19 July 1962; 'Beschluss des DGB-Bundesausschusses', 24 July 1962.

(⁹⁸) AdsD, DGB, Abt. Organisation, 24/9005: 'Vorschläge für Veranstaltungen zum 1. September', c.1962.

(⁹⁹) IfZ, ED 702-52: ICDF, Report of Inaugural Congress held at Tyringe, Sweden, 9-13 January 1964, Volume One: Working Sessions, 42-5.

(¹⁰⁰) IISG, WRI-11: Tony Smythe, 'W.R.I. and the International Peace Movement', WRI 11th Triennial Conference, Stavanger (Norway), Document 5, p. 4.

(¹⁰¹) For examples of such performative acts in a different campaign, cf. Michael S. Foley, *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance during the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, NC, and London, 2003).

(¹⁰²) IISG, WRI-11: Comments by Theodor Michaltscheff on a paper by Pierre Martin, WRI 11th Triennial Conference, Stavanger (Norway), 27-9 July 1963.

(¹⁰³) Cf., for example, Günter Wernecke and Lawrence S. Wittner, 'Lifting the Iron Curtain: The Peace March to Moscow of 1960–1961', *International History Review*, 21 (1999), 900–17.

(¹⁰⁴) Cf. Duff, *Left, Left, Left*, 115–16; *Peace News*, 26 June 1959, 2.

(¹⁰⁵) George Thayer, *The British Political Fringe: A Profile* (London, 1965), 174.

(¹⁰⁶) BJL, JS-6: *CND Newsletter*, 8, 19 June 1958; IISG, WRI-235: 'Was bedeutet dieses Zeichen?', *Der Kriegsdienstgegner: Mitteilungsblatt der WRI Deutscher Zweig* (October 1963); 4 (1963), 10.

(¹⁰⁷) IISG, WRI-252: Klaus Vack to the WRI, 28 September 1962; HIS, TEM 200,03: Circular no. 1, Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner, 11 November 1961.

(¹⁰⁸) Kraushaar, *Die Protest-Chronik*, iii. 1838; Kurt Vogel, 'Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner', *Wir sind jung*, 2 (June 1961), 5–7.

(¹⁰⁹) IfZ, ED 702/7: Heinrich Frieling, 'Fragen der Werbung' 9 (n.d., c.1964).

(¹¹⁰) Kraushaar, *Die Protest-Chronik*, iii. 1834; on the political relevance of this image, see Benjamin Ziemann, 'The Code of Protest: Images of Peace in the West German Peace Movements, 1945–1990', *Contemporary European History*, 17 (2008), 237–61, here 247.

(¹¹¹) Benjamin Ziemann, 'The Code of Protest', 247–8.

(¹¹²) TNA PREM 11/2778: Macmillan to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 24 March 1958; PolArchAA B31/116: London Embassy to German Foreign Office, 11 March 1958; *Konrad Adenauer: Reden 1917–1967*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart, 1987), 357.

(¹¹³) Mervyn Jones, 'The Time is Short', in Norman MacKenzie (ed.), *Conviction* (London, 1958), 199.

(¹¹⁴) Duff, *Left, Left, Left*, 231.

(¹¹⁵) Paul Betts and David Crowley, 'Introduction', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40 (2005), 213–36; Claire Langhamer, 'The Meanings of Home in Postwar Britain', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40 (2005), 341–62.

(¹¹⁶) Cf., for example, Hermann Speelmann to Dr. Gerhard Schmidt, 12 October 1963, quoted in Appelius, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland*, 513.

(¹¹⁷) BAK, ZSg. 1-262/3: 'Informationen zur Abrüstung', 3 (Sept. 1963); 'Angst—ein schlechter Ratgeber', *Westfälische Rundschau*, 18 November 1957, 2; 'Atomwaffen und Atomangst', *Industriekurier*, 28 March 1958; BAK B145/4224: IfD, Stimmung no. 291, 'Die Atomrüstung' (April 1957), 5. For Britain MRC,

MSS.181/4: Benn W. Levy, *Britain and the Bomb. The Fallacy of Nuclear Defence*, CND pamphlet [n.d.], 3; *Peace News*, 20 February 1959, 5; *Peace News*, 22 May 1959, 6.

(¹¹⁸) Heinrich Vogel on the East-Berlin Synod, April 1958, quoted in *Berlin 1958*, 51.

(¹¹⁹) BAK, ZSg. 1-E/70: Helene Wessel, 'Das Leben in Gefahr', in *Kampf dem Atomtod* (Bonn, 1958), 13; J. B. Priestley, quoted in Minion and Bolsover (eds), *The CND Story*, 15.

(¹²⁰) AdsD, 2/PVAM000044: Circular by the *Naturfreundejugend*, 27 September 1959, 2; Bertrand Russell, *Has Man a Future* (Harmondsworth, 1961), 121; John Brunner, *The Brink* (London, 1959).

(¹²¹) MRC, MSS 181/4: Benn Levy, *Britain and the Bomb*, CND pamphlet c.1961; *Sanity or Suicide?* (c.1960).

(¹²²) BAK, ZSg. 1-E/70: Stefan Andres, 'Dem Atomwahnsinn in den Arm fallen', in *Kampf dem Atomtod* (Bonn, 1958), 25.

(¹²³) Anthony Carew, 'Woman with a Bomb on her Mind', *Daily Herald*, 30 November 1961.

(¹²⁴) On the concept of 'crisis' and its relationship to Christian and humanist thinking cf. Reinhart Koselleck, 'Some Questions Regarding the Conceptual History of "Crisis"', in idem, *The Practice of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, 2002), 236-47.

(¹²⁵) 'A round-up of international action against the Bomb', *Peace News*, 6 March 1959, 6; AdsD 2/PVAM00024: Handout, Berliner Studentenkongreß, n.d. [January 1959]; *Peace News*, 4 August 1961, 1, on Berlin; *Informationen zur Abrüstung*, 3 (1963), 3-8; Hilary Bourne, 'In Fleet Street', *Sanity*, October 1962, 3.

(¹²⁶) HWR, 72.86.519, 240 and 242-6: Kloppenburg to Wilhelm Keller, copied to Hans Werner Richter 'with sincere wishes', 11 December 1961; HIS, TEM 700,02: 'Entwurf zu einem Gründungsmanifest: Komitee der 100'.

(¹²⁷) *Sanity*, December 1962, 7; HIS, TEM 300,02: 'Anregungen für's Bonner Lobby' (October 1962).

(¹²⁸) BAK, image 183-57383-0001.

(¹²⁹) Interview with Hans-Konrad Tempel, 20 August 2002; Kraushaar, *Die Protest-Chronik*, iii. 1850.

(¹³⁰) Letter to *The Guardian*, 31 October 1962, 8.

(¹³¹) BAK, ZSg. 1-214/1: 'Scheidung der Geister und Wege', Hamburg, n.d. [c. 1960], 5; *Sanity* (January 1963), 4.

(¹³²) Brian Masters, *The Swinging Sixties* (London, 1985), 204; BLPES, CND/1/4: CND annual reports 1961-2 and 1962-3; 'Young CND', *Sanity* (Easter March special 1963), 1; HIS, TEM 200,03: Central Committee, minutes, 14/15 October 1961, 4.

(¹³³) 'Ostermärsche wurden kaum beachtet', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 5 April 1961, 3; Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 'Einige Vorschläge zur Methode des Kampfes gegen die atomare Aufrüstung', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 4 (1958), 410-14, here 414; IfZ, ED 702/7: Dr Heinrich Frieling, 'Fragen der Werbung', n.d. [c.1964].

(¹³⁴) Kai Arne Linnemann, 'Die Sammlung der Mitte und die Wandlung des Bürgers', in Manfred Hettling and Bernd Ulrich (eds), *Bürgertum nach 1945* (Hamburg, 2005), 185-220, here 206.

(¹³⁵) Irene Stoehr, 'Phalanx der Frauen? Wiederaufrüstung und Weiblichkeit in Westdeutschland 1950-1957', in Christiane Eifler and Ruth Seifert (eds), *Soziale Konstruktionen—Militär und Geschlechterverhältnisse* (Münster, 1998), 187-204; Thomas Kühne, '“Aus diesem Krieg werden nicht nur harte Männer heimkehren”: Kriegskameradschaft und Männlichkeit im 20. Jahrhundert', in Kühne (ed.), *Männergeschichte—Geschlechtergeschichte: Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne* (Frankfurt/Main and New York, 1996), 174-92, here 188-9.

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