



two superpowers. It aims to make the cold war comprehensible as war by focusing on the nuclear arms race as its core element and to demonstrate its profound impact on politics during this time period. Unlike Anders, however, I am interested in how people acted within the context of the cold war. I examine how people **(p.2)** became aware of the arms race as the core of the cold war, how they sought to challenge their respective governments to end the arms race, and how they wrote their own experiences and memories into the cold war. Not least, this book seeks to show how, on the basis of these contestations, activists discovered political and social causes that led them away from regarding the nuclear arms race as the primary and fundamental problem in international relations.<sup>3</sup>

This study therefore focuses on what I call the 'politics of security'. 'Security' in its incarnation of 'national security' is often regarded as a hegemonic concept during the cold war. Historians and political scientists usually deploy it to describe governmental policies and politics. It normally signifies a general orientation towards stability, the status quo, safety, the avoidance of risks, and therefore the avoidance of utopian schemes. But the precise meaning of 'security' is not clear: there exists a wide variety of definitions of 'security'; it is an 'essentially contested concept'.<sup>4</sup> 'Security' is not merely out there. It is the product of the ways in which societies define which dangers threaten their governments, way of life, and values.<sup>5</sup> Discussions about security thus evoked political feelings and emotions that were inversely related to discussions about fear.<sup>6</sup> By focusing on the *politics* of security, I want to suggest that 'security' merely offered a common discursive terrain from which defence and foreign policy could be debated and contested. This concerned the question of the reference point for discussions of security (what Christopher Daase called its 'reference dimension'), the question of how exactly 'security' should be defined (the 'issue dimension'), as well as the 'geographical scope' and the kinds of dangers that formed part of the discussions.<sup>7</sup> Its **(p.3)** significance was that of 'an ambiguous symbol': like the *sýmbolon* of ancient cultures, it is a sign for something else, and its meanings are politically and socially embedded.<sup>8</sup>

'Security' was one of the key words in Britain and West Germany from the end of the Second World War into the cold war, as it symbolized the challenges of political, social, and moral reconstruction after the mass violence of that conflict, but it also referred to security from a future military confrontation. It served as a code that bridged the gaps between social, economic, foreign, and defence policy.<sup>9</sup> By discussing 'security', people therefore also evoked its opposites: danger and fear. Debates about 'security' evoke key issues of governance and government: political and social theorists since the early modern period have designated the guarantee of the security of a country's population the core function of good government and governance. And yet policy-making, especially in defence and foreign policy, was part of the machinery of both countries' 'secret states'.<sup>10</sup> Discussions about 'security' therefore always involved debates

about the legitimacy of what Michael Mann has called states' 'geopolitical privacy'.<sup>11</sup>

Specifically, this book considers the British and West German protests against nuclear weapons during the early phase of the cold war as well as their predecessors and their successors. I seek to undercut the 'comfortable dichotomies of power and resistance' that have characterized most of the historical scholarship on social movements.<sup>12</sup> Such approaches have reified the distance between oppositional cultures and movement organizations, on the one hand, and mainstream politics, on the other hand. They have thus provided interpretations that read organizations as the **(p.4)** structural embodiments of counter- or subcultures.<sup>13</sup> Instead, I aim to demonstrate the dialectical and dialogical processes by which social movement activists engaged with their societies by highlighting how activists in the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the West German 'Campaign against Atomic Death' and 'Easter Marches of Nuclear Weapons Opponents' challenged, developed, but also appropriated languages and practices of security in manifold ways. This book seeks to make the anti-nuclear-weapons protesters in both countries comprehensible as 'strangers at the gates' 'who operate on the boundaries of the polity', but are nonetheless connected with it.<sup>14</sup> Both movements challenged elements of their societies, but they were also part of those very societies. Opposition against nuclear weapons mobilized substantial popular movements across the world. In 1959, between 20,000 and 25,000 people took part in the final rally of the second annual British protest march against nuclear weapons between the nuclear weapons establishment in Aldermaston, Berkshire, and central London. For 1960, the estimates for the final rally on Trafalgar Square vary between 60,000 and 100,000 participants. In 1961, between 40,000 and 50,000 people participated.<sup>15</sup> In the Federal Republic, campaigns against nuclear weapons enjoyed a similar popularity. By 1964 more than 100,000 in the whole of the Federal Republic took part. Similarly, in the United States, in Scandinavia, and in Japan, people took their opposition to nuclear armaments to the streets.<sup>16</sup> The anti-nuclear-weapons movements in both countries were the largest of their kind in Europe, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people during their peak period in the late 1950s and early 1960s and relying on the more silent consent of public opinion of many more.

Treating both movements in one study also helps us to take account of the fact that British and West German history had become deeply entangled in the twentieth century during and in the wake of two world **(p.5)** wars as well as the cold war. As Susan Pedersen has noted, 'the struggle with Germany shaped Britain in the twentieth century as deeply as the struggle with France did in the eighteenth', and Britain was one of the three main occupying powers in cold war West Germany.<sup>17</sup> The movements in both countries came to be closely intertwined and developed a mutual awareness of their position at the same historical conjuncture of the cold war arms race. They shared in some of the

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same historical processes, while at the same time remaining firmly anchored in local and national political contexts, not least because the similar experiences and arguments could have completely different resonances.

In order to take account of this constellation, my book combines comparative history with a transnational optic. It highlights the networks between the movements and how mutual observations among activists themselves informed a 'comparative imagination'.<sup>18</sup> My conception of transnational history therefore goes beyond one that focuses on inter- or cross-cultural transfers and relies on rather straightforward models of diffusion.<sup>19</sup> Instead, I seek to highlight how the transnational and national levels were mutually intertwined. My objective is not to develop a clear set of criteria that explain specific outcomes. Rather than focusing on origins and thus reifying nationalism methodologically, my interest lies in using this approach to highlight historical specificities, ambiguities and paradoxes and thereby stress the interaction of 'distinctive processes, their complex imbrication, their differing temporalities, their territorially uneven application, and their unanticipated outcomes.'<sup>20</sup>

This is, then, a book about 'lives lived out on the borderlands, lives for which the central interpretative devices of the culture don't quite work', and I seek to highlight 'the complexity of people's relationship to the situation they inherit'.<sup>21</sup> This implies trying to combine attention to the eventfulness of activism with an awareness of the longer political-cultural patterns in which the protests were embedded. This is an attempt to steer clear of both master narratives of long-term social-cultural **(p.6)** changes, on the one hand, and an inward-looking protest history, on the other.<sup>22</sup>

I do this by taking inspiration from more recent research on social movements in the social sciences and developing it further by incorporating the importance of international relations for the formation of domestic social relations. Social scientists have moved away from structuralist or individualist explanations of social action and have come to highlight how it is possible to create order in conditions of uncertainty. They have shown that social movements do not have the organizational capacities that political parties or trade unions have, but they nonetheless constitute more than a series of protest events.<sup>23</sup>

This book investigates the role the cold war arms race played in accounting for how 'the unstable ordering of multiple possibilities' within societies became 'temporarily fixed in such a way as to enable individuals and groups to behave as a particular kind of agency', how 'people [became] shaped into acting subjects'.<sup>24</sup> I seek to highlight how activists' engagement with the cold war nuclear arms race enabled them to think of themselves as members of a *movement*, and to be considered as such by observers. My emphasis is, therefore, on the cognitive frames that activists developed as part of their politics of security, their forms of activism, as well as their practices within the

context of tangible social networks.<sup>25</sup> 'Frames' are schemata of interpretations that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events, and establishing a set of shared interpretations is key for the emergence and sustainability of social movements.<sup>26</sup>

While the movements' names and the salience of the topic in domestic politics gave the campaigns some coherence and endowed them with a clear beginning and end, they never possessed fixed collective identities.<sup>27</sup> **(p.7)** Instead, I stress the variety and diversity of activists' views and experiences in order to place them in their concrete historical contexts.<sup>28</sup> This book aims to uncover the political processes during which protesters' manifold experiences converged within the movements without ever being identical with them. Rather than being founded on 'identity', these processes involved identifications: the ways in which the protesters came to identify nuclear armaments as an issue of concern, the identification of solutions to these concerns, the protesters' identification with what became 'the movement', and the creation of boundaries between them and the society surrounding them.<sup>29</sup>

This was not merely a constellation of challenge and reaction. Rather, in what Marshall Sahlins has called the 'structure of the conjuncture', 'a set of historical relationships' at once reproduced 'the traditional cultural categories' and gave them 'new values': the actual practices of framing themselves produced novelty.<sup>30</sup> We therefore do not encounter pure or authentic movement activists and their experiences.<sup>31</sup> I am instead interested in highlighting the extent to which some dominant discourses of the age were internalized and negotiated and, through that, created activism. Conflicts are social relationships that the actors involved tend to reify, as they struggle for the same symbolic or material resources. They nonetheless still share the same field of action, but merely interpret it in different ways.<sup>32</sup>

The notable absence of women and female voices in most of my story underlines this ambiguity. It is therefore important to note at the outset that their absence was a constant presence that ran as the *basso continuo* throughout the politics of security. A highly gendered division of labour was a constant presence in both movements, with predominantly male front-line activists and women who were channelled away to the more informal leadership level or backroom duties, such as typing and cooking. Despite this gendered division, the movements still provided **(p.8)** female activists with openings to challenge those very conditions.<sup>33</sup> Not least, some of the languages that male and female activists employed, such as languages of sensibility and suffering and of experiences, and the heroic form that some of the stories of male activists took is itself difficult to think through without specifically female experiences and knowledges.<sup>34</sup>

Because of this dialectic relationship, the study of social movements can offer valuable insights into broader trends within cold war politics, society, and culture. Social movements crossed boundaries: they challenged existing political, social, and cultural practices as well as norms and beliefs. They quite literally crossed borders by regarding themselves as both local and global actors. Yet, at the same time, they still related their activism to more mainstream politics.<sup>35</sup> Social movements therefore bring into sharp relief the very concept of the political—namely, the forces and factors that open or close down what is perceived to be possible in politics. Analyzing them allows us insights into the transformations of such political imaginaries.<sup>36</sup> Pierre Bourdieu has argued that knowledge and politics are inextricably linked: politics is ultimately about perception and legitimate definitions of reality. This happens primarily by drawing boundaries that help to classify what is regarded as legitimate.<sup>37</sup> This process is complicated further because society has to be imagined before it can take place: ‘politics works on this imaginary field by seeking to make stable and unitary sense of what is going on.’<sup>38</sup>

This was especially true for foreign and defence policy during the cold war. Policy-making itself went on in secret, and the arms race itself could be grasped only indirectly through armaments statistics, radiation measurements, or the simulation of war in nuclear weapons tests. The core of cold war politics was, therefore, a contest over specific representations of the reality of the nuclear weapons and the arms race: did they merely pose risks that could be managed and controlled like risks of any other technology? Or did nuclear weapons, as the protesters claimed, pose **(p.9)** dangers that were precisely outside the realm of efficient control and management?<sup>39</sup> I am therefore interested in exploring, through the lens of the politics of security, the ‘wider set of political dispositions—codes of conduct, values, assumptions, identifications, and contests that characterize the relationship between citizens and the political system of governance’ in both countries.<sup>40</sup> In particular, I wish to find out how and when specific cultural assumptions about ‘security’ became politicized.<sup>41</sup>

My approach has implications for the selection and use of archival sources: any archive is made from selected and consciously chosen documents, and that is especially true for the study of social movements—it is in their very nature, as networks of activists, initially not to develop a sense of their organizational coherence. Many archives are, therefore, personal collections of pamphlets, papers, diaries, letters, and photographs—some have ended up in public and even state archives, others are still in private collections. Their existence, or their lack of coherence, are themselves expressions of the constantly evolving notions of the political in the two countries. It is telling that, of the social movements under consideration here, only the SPD-led ‘Campaign against Atomic Death’ and the British CND as well as the pressure groups in the orbit of the West German Easter Marches, such as the War Resisters’ International and the German Peace Society, had their own archival collections. It is important,

then, to realize that in this case, perhaps even less than in other cases, there is no real sovereignty of the archive, but there are many loose ends that historians need to accept and interpret rather than challenge.<sup>42</sup>

This book builds upon and seeks to braid together in productive ways four strands of research on post-1945 European history. Through its comparative nature and its awareness for transnational relations and mutual observations, it seeks to bring together the histories of two countries under one conceptual rubric.<sup>43</sup> Their histories and historiographies have, because of the by and large national orientation of most historical **(p.10)** scholarship, been written apart from one another, although they unfolded within the same historical conjuncture of post-war reconstruction and cold war politics. Comparing the histories of British and West German anti-nuclear-weapons activists is, therefore, also an opportunity to bring the existing historiographies in conversation with one another.

Through its focus on debates about the political, this book takes issue with linking social movements directly to processes of social and cultural change during the 1950s and 1960s that some have conceptualized as 'liberalization', and others have interpreted as the transformation of sociocultural values or generational changes.<sup>44</sup> In such explanations, social movements tend to become either the mouthpieces of anonymous social structures, or the expression of novel social values. They appear as the direct outcomes, or even products, of rising affluence, and the growth of 'permissiveness', so that their protests are ultimately written into the mainstream and become part of more general processes of 'liberalization', or the 'peacetime revolutions' of post-war societies.<sup>45</sup> Such stories, however, neglect the ambiguities and ambivalences of the political and societal transformations that characterized post-war societies, and they forget to account for 'the continuing force and adaptability of nineteenth-century cultural forms' within the context of affluent societies.<sup>46</sup> But it would be equally problematic to regard the protest movements in Britain only as expressions of the *longue durée* of British radicalism.<sup>47</sup> This book **(p.11)** highlights, by contrast, that tradition is not a stable and static relationship to the past. Rather, focusing on traditions means considering the manner in which past experiences are passed on through webs of personal relationships.<sup>48</sup> At the same time, it seeks to take account of the eventfulness of the age, the importance of real contestations for the developments.

This book, therefore, speaks directly to, and thereby historicizes, the debate about the 'the peculiarities of the English'. In that debate, E. P. Thompson and Perry Anderson, both involved in activism at the time, discussed the role of the dynamics of contention in English political culture and reflected on the importance of 'traditions' for the stability of British class society.<sup>49</sup> What enables this move from stories of origins to genealogies is the second historiographical theme in this book. Although it has been one of the main fields of investigation in

the contemporary history of West Germany, this topic has been relegated to the sidelines in studies of the recent British past: understanding the history of post-1945 from the viewpoint of post-war history.<sup>50</sup> The boundary between pre-1945 violence and post-1945 peace and affluence is far less clearly drawn than often presumed. Following cues from Frank Biess, Svenja Goltermann, and Bob Moeller, this work brings into view the 'multifaceted consequences of the war' within societies that seemed to be increasingly peaceful.<sup>51</sup> Post-war history, as Frank Biess has put it, 'focuses not so much on what societies became, but [rather on] from what they emerged'. This book, therefore, seeks to uncover the hidden and not so hidden traces of war in both post-war societies and to identify the specific linkages between war and post-war.<sup>52</sup> This book demonstrates how the experiences and memories of the Second World War were crucial in making the cold war comprehensible. Well into the 1960s, West German and British activists (**p.12**) imagined the cold war arms race as a constant pre-war situation; they viewed a potential nuclear war through the lens of their own experiences and memories of the Second World War. Their protests therefore appear as direct enactments of the memory of the Second World War.<sup>53</sup> Civil defence played a relatively limited role, compared with other matters of concern, in movement debates at the time. Given the existence of a number of studies that analyse these debates from a comparative perspective, this book will not discuss them in greater detail.<sup>54</sup> For the same reason, the role of nuclear war in popular culture is discussed here only in so far as it had direct repercussions for the ways in which protesters framed their activities.<sup>55</sup>

The histories of the British and West German anti-nuclear-weapons movements during the time period covered by this book has already been the subject of several studies.<sup>56</sup> Yet, with the important exception of James Hinton's book on the role of nationalism in the history of British peace activism, most of this work argues primarily from an organizational perspective and therefore tends to ignore the manifold ways in which protest practices and cognitive frameworks were tied to more general debates in West German and British political cultures.<sup>57</sup> The (**p.13**) underlying reason for this is that they are based on a specific vision of what politics is and should be about, mainly organized through interest group or party politics. However, they neglect that the very creation of social formations is in itself highly contested and political, and that definitions of the boundaries of political activity are always in flux.<sup>58</sup> Thus, only because she argues through the narrow and static optic of interest-group politics can Helen McCarthy come to the striking conclusion that the idea of democratized international relations had no salience after 1945: she infers from recognizing the decline and demise of the specific *form* of pressure group politics in the League of Nations Union after 1945 that the topic as a whole was no longer relevant for British politics.<sup>59</sup> Conversely, social-movement scholars have often presupposed a deinstitutionalized understanding of politics rather than actually delineating specific political genealogies.



Some of these conceptual problems also have an impact on the fourth field to which this book seeks to contribute: the importance of the cold war for domestic political cultures, including social activism, which has often been written from the perspective of challenge and response. Jeremi Suri's path-breaking work has opened up a whole field for investigation by developing an argument about the relationship between social and cultural change, activism around the world, and the politics of *détente* in international relations.<sup>60</sup> Martin Klimke has provided us with a profound archivally grounded study of the multiple connections between American and West German activists, and the ways in which their respective **(p. 14)** government assessed them as 'the other alliance' over the course of the 1960s.<sup>61</sup>

In a powerful critique of these approaches, Quinn Slobodian has emphasized forms of internationalism that cannot find their expression in symbolic alliances and their links to the politics of the past. Instead, he has conceptualized them as lived in and through agency and interactions in concrete works of solidarity with those projects of political transformation and national liberation that could be found beyond Europe and the North Atlantic in Africa, America, and Asia. The importance of this work is that it alerts us powerfully to the importance of the many concrete ways of feeling and interacting in the history of activism around 1968. It thus offers a way of engaging with the *global* nature of the cold war and what this implied for local conceptions of pluralism and feelings of belonging among West German activists.<sup>62</sup> My own study further develops this approach by emphasizing the complexities of transnational protests in the early cold war as the direct result of the active production and reproduction of contestations over the changing shape of the political, and by highlighting the multiple forms of protest and belonging that emerged within the movements. This will allow me to write a history of these social movements that does not follow the traditional modernist-functionalist paradigms of 'left' and 'right' and of organized politics.

In line with trying to highlight the dynamic character of the movements and the multiple genealogies, I do not seek to tell the parallel and interconnected stories of the British and West German activists in a process of temporal revelation. Instead, I have chosen to arrange my material in a mixture of chronological and thematic chapters. This also means that, at times, British or West German activists can be heard more loudly, or that connections are foregrounded at some points, but a more implicit presence at others. The politico-cultural transformations that are the subject of this book generated many inconclusive and ambiguous outcomes. The first chapter seeks to highlight the ways in which British and West German activists gained an awareness of the problems of the nuclear arms race. This was fundamentally the story of how the British and West German activists gained an awareness of sharing a common historical conjuncture.

**(p.15)** The second and third chapters trace the ways in which activists from very different backgrounds in both countries found their ways into the social movements. Frustrated with the strictures that the bipolarity of cold war thinking imposed on their own milieux, they saw that the movements could provide them with multiple openings to think through the politics of security as a form of politics that went beyond the cold war. The fourth chapter highlights the role movement organization played in forging the movements. The next two chapters highlight the key frames that emerged within the movements: understandings of the nation in the context of international relations; and the protest marches themselves and the emotions they created.

The last three chapters trace the divergent paths of transformation of the politics of security in both countries over the course of the 1960s: how, on the basis of these discussions, the movements provided an opening for wider discussions about the relationship between politics and culture; the emergence of a politics of solidarity; and the development of grass-roots politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Fundamentally, the movements not only contributed to the politics of security by making specific policy proposals but also helped generate inter-personal security among the activists through providing them with a community. By forming social links and networks, the activists managed to generate a feeling of belonging as well as the impression among observers that the movements were indeed the unitary political actors they purported to be. These feelings of belonging were, in the end, a way of dealing with the complexities of political communication in societies that appeared to be increasingly insecure. It is mainly due to this interaction that we can now write their history as not merely a history of protest events, but rather a history of movement.

### Notes:

<sup>(1)</sup> Günther Anders, 'Theses for the Atomic Age', *Massachusetts Review*, 3/3 (1962), 493-505, here 505. On Anders's conceptual importance, see Benjamin Ziemann, 'Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War. Introduction', in Ziemann (ed.), *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War* (Essen, 2007), 13-38, here 12-15, and Michael Geyer, 'Der kriegerische Blick: Rückblick auf einen noch zu beendenden Krieg', *SoWi*, 19 (1990), 111-17.

<sup>(2)</sup> Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen*, ii. *Über die Zerstörung des Lebens im Zeitalter der dritten industriellen Revolution* (Munich, 1980), 5 (epitaph). On the historicization of Anders's ideas, see Holger Nehring, 'Technologie, Moderne und Gewalt: Günther Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (1956)', in Habbo Knoch et al. (eds), *Klassiker modernen Denkens neu gelesen* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011), 238-47.

<sup>(3)</sup> Cf. the pathbreaking attempt at a social history of the cold war by Paul Steege, *Black Market, Cold War: Everyday Life in Berlin, 1946-1949* (Cambridge, 2007).

<sup>(4)</sup> Christopher Daase, 'Die Historisierung der Sicherheit. Anmerkungen zur historischen Sicherheitsforschung aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 38, 3 (2012), 387-405; Emma Rothschild, 'What is Security?', *Daedalus*, 124 (1995), 53; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CO, 1991), 3-5.

<sup>(5)</sup> David M. Goldstein, 'Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security', *Current Anthropology*, 51 (2010), 487-99; Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York, 1995), 46-86; for a critique of the latter approach as 'anti-political', see Matt McDonald, 'Securitization and the Construction of Security', *European Journal of International Relations*, 14 (2008), 563-87.

<sup>(6)</sup> On framing such debates as discussions about fear, see the pathbreaking research by Frank Biess, 'Feelings in the Aftermath: Toward a History of Postwar Emotions', in Frank Biess and Robert Moeller (eds), *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe* (New York, 2010), 30-48.

<sup>(7)</sup> Christopher Daase, 'National, Societal, and Human Security: On the Transformation of Political Language', *Historical Social Research*, 35/4 (2010), 22-37.

<sup>(8)</sup> Arnold Wolfers, '"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', *Political Science Quarterly*, 67 (1952), 481-502.

<sup>(9)</sup> Eckart Conze, 'Sicherheit als Kultur: Überlegungen zu einer "modernen Politikgeschichte" der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 53 (2005), 357-80 and Conze, *Die Suche nach Sicherheit: Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1949 bis in die Gegenwart* (Berlin, 2009); Hans Braun, 'Das Streben nach "Sicherheit" in den 50er Jahren: Soziale und Politische Ursachen und Erscheinungsweisen', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 18 (1978), 279-306.

<sup>(10)</sup> Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst 1945-2010* (Harmondsworth, 2010); Arnulf Baring, *Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie: Westdeutsche Innenpolitik im Zeichen der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft* (Munich, 1971); on the genealogies of secrets of state, cf. Bernhard W. Wegener, *Der geheime Staat: Arkantradition und Informationsfreiheitsrecht* (Göttingen, 2006).

<sup>(11)</sup> Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism* (Oxford, 1988), 32.

(<sup>12</sup>) Paul Steege, Andrew Stuart Bergerson, Maureen Healy, and Pamela E. Swett, 'The History of Everyday Life: A Second Chapter', *Journal of Modern History*, 80 (2008), 358-78, here 370. Cf. also Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, 'Die Phantasie an die Macht'. *Mai 68 in Frankreich* (Frankfurt/Main 1995).

(<sup>13</sup>) Cf. Francesca Polletta, ' "Free Spaces" in Collective Action', *Theory and Society*, 28 (1999), 1-38, here 13 and 20; Marc W. Steinberg, 'The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners', *American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (1999), 736-80, here 741-2.

(<sup>14</sup>) Sidney Tarrow, *Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics* (Cambridge, 2012), 3.

(<sup>15</sup>) Cf. Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb: The British Peace Movement 1958-1965* (Oxford, 1988), 42, 57, 77 n. 16.

(<sup>16</sup>) Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement 1954-1970* (Stanford, CA, 1997), 220, and Hans Karl Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer: Der Kampf gegen die Atombewaffnung in den fünfziger Jahren. Eine Studie zur innenpolitischen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik* (Cologne 1970), 130-43.

(<sup>17</sup>) Susan Pedersen, 'Roundtable: Twentieth-Century British History in North America', *Twentieth Century British History*, 21/3 (2010), 375-418, here 393.

(<sup>18</sup>) George M. Fredrickson, *The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism and Social Movements* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2000).

(<sup>19</sup>) See, conceptually, Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (Cambridge, 2005), 32; Sean Scalmer, 'Translating Contention: Culture, History, and the Circulation of Collective Action', *Alternatives*, 25 (2000), 491-514.

(<sup>20</sup>) Simon Gunn and James Vernon, 'Introduction', in Gunn and Vernon (eds), *The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in Imperial Britain* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2011), 1-18, here 13.

(<sup>21</sup>) Carolyn Kay Steedman, *Landscape for a Good Woman* (London, 1986), 5, 19.

(<sup>22</sup>) For differently accentuated attempts, see Nick Thomas, 'Challenging Myths of the 1960s: The Case of Student Protest in Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, 13, 3 (2002), 277-97, and Lucy Robinson, *Gay Men and the Left in Post-War Britain: How The Personal Got Political* (Manchester, 2007).

(<sup>23</sup>) Andreas Pettenkofer, *Radikaler Protest: Zur soziologischen Theorie politischer Bewegungen* (Frankfurt/Main, 2010); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge, 1998).

(<sup>24</sup>) Geoff Eley, 'Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Two Decades Later', in Terrence J. McDonald (ed.), *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor, 1996), 193–243, here 220.

(<sup>25</sup>) David E. Snow and Robert Benford, 'Master Frames and Cycles of Protest', in Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, (eds), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven, 1992), 133–55, here 137.

(<sup>26</sup>) David A. Snow, et al., 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review*, 51 (1986), 464–81.

(<sup>27</sup>) For a critique of the term 'identity', see Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', *Theory and Society*, 29 (2000), 1–47; and Lutz Niethammer, *Kollektive Identität: Heimliche Quellen einer unheimlichen Konjunktur* (Reinbek, 2000), esp. ch. 1.

(<sup>28</sup>) Cf. Robert Gildea and James Mark, 'Introduction: Voices of Europe's '68', *Cultural and Social History*, 8/4 (2011), 441–8. On the problems of conceptualizing 'experience' as a historical category, see Harold Mah, 'The Predicament of Experience', *Modern Intellectual History*, 5 (2008), 97–119.

(<sup>29</sup>) Charles Tilly, 'Social Boundary Processes', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 34 (2004), 211–36.

(<sup>30</sup>) Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago, 1985), pp. vii, 72, 125 (quotation).

(<sup>31</sup>) Conceptually important: Kathryn Gleadle, *Borderline Citizens: Women, Gender and Political Culture in Britain, 1815–1867* (Oxford, 2009), and Carolyn Kay Steedman, *Master and Servant: Love and Labour in the English Industrial Age* (Cambridge, 2007), 26, 219–24.

(<sup>32</sup>) Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge, 1996), 355–6; Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach* (Cambridge, 1991), 3–10.

(<sup>33</sup>) Sheila Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream: Remembering the Sixties* (Harmondsworth, 2000); Robinson, *Gay Men and the Left*; Belinda Robnett, 'African-American Women in the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1965: Gender, Leadership, and Micromobilization', *American Journal of Sociology*, 101 (1996), 1661–93, here 1667.

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<sup>(37)</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, 1992), 171–202; Bourdieu, *Soziologische Fragen* (Frankfurt/Main, 1993), 51–2, 83–90.

<sup>(38)</sup> Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, *The Future of Class in History: What's Left of the Social?* (Ann Arbor, 2007), 169.

<sup>(39)</sup> Ziemann, 'Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War', 19.

<sup>(40)</sup> Kathleen Canning, 'Introduction: The Politics of Symbols, Semantics, and Sentiments in the Weimar Republic', *Central European History*, 43 (2010), 567–80.

<sup>(41)</sup> Margaret Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights* (Cambridge, 2008), 171–210; Karl Rohe, 'Politische Kultur und ihre Analyse: Probleme und Perspektiven der politischen Kulturforschung', *Historische Zeitschrift* 250 (1990), 321–46. The pathbreaking historical study is Detlef Siegfried, *Time Is on my Side: Konsum und Politik in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur der 60er Jahre* (Göttingen, 2006).

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<sup>(48)</sup> Craig Calhoun, *Roots of Radicalism: Tradition, the Public Sphere and Early Nineteenth-Century Social Movements* (Chicago, 2012), 289–90.

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