



Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970

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Abstract and Keywords

The attempts at sociological identification and definition by activists and observers alike were at once struggles over the representation of the activists' political experiences. This chapter explores these diverse political experiences behind anti-nuclear-weapons activism and is concerned with delineating the social networks on which the British and West German campaigns rested. It charts the processes during which people in both Britain and Germany turned into activists, and is concerned with uncovering the diverse genealogies of motivations that led people towards the campaigns. This chapter's focus is on the main (and often overlapping and interconnected) groups that were involved in the protests, as most of the activists still identified themselves with other social groups and parties: intellectuals, Christians, members of the labour movements, youth movement activists and pacifists.

Keywords: composition of cnd and the west german easter marches, labour party politics, new left, pacifism, christians, canon collins, kingsley martin, martin niemöller, E. P. Thompson, John Saville

The attempts at sociological identification and definition by activists and observers alike were at once struggles over the representation of the activists' political experiences. This chapter explores these diverse political experiences behind anti-nuclear-weapons activism and is concerned with delineating the social networks on which the British and West German campaigns rested. It charts the processes during which people in both Britain and Germany turned into activists, and seeks to uncover the diverse genealogies of motivations that led people towards the campaigns. This chapter's focus is on the main (and often

overlapping and interconnected) groups that were involved in the protests, as most of the activists still identified themselves with other social groups and parties: intellectuals, Christians, members of the labour movements, youth movement activists, and pacifists.

Many activists were quite keen to maintain their pre-existing identifications, be they party-political or religious, and they regarded their involvement in the anti-nuclear-weapons movements as an attempt to rescue what they thought had been lost in their own life worlds. Most of them came to the campaigns because of experiences of profound dissonance within their own organizations, and they regarded their activities as both restoration and rejuvenation: just as they did not see that the threat of nuclear weapons was properly represented in the official politics of security, they also had a problem finding their own experiences, memories, hopes, and dreams represented in the various personal and organizational contexts to which they belonged. This resulted in highly ambiguous temporalities, as the momentum behind the protests derived as much from efforts at restoring something that had been lost, as from creating something new. In both countries, then, political, social, and cultural traditions, understood not as reified entities, but in terms of the manner in which knowledge about politics was passed on, were crucial in linking individual activists to the evolving campaigns.

(p.88) Both countries saw ‘multiple restorations’ of utopian knowledges of political transformation that harked back to the 1920s and the hopes for creating a national moral community in the wake of war.¹ In Britain, this temporality found its expressions in the many forms of democratic populism that emerged from the Second World War; in West Germany we could see similar attempts to recreate a ground from which democracy and civility could be re-created and to revive an awareness of the political debates of the 1920s.² They linked the Depression and the outbreak of the Second World War ‘in a discourse of democracy and public good’.³ In Britain, such conceptualizations rested on the belief that wartime and the immediate post-war had created ‘an existential reality to the organic conception of society in a way that had never been achieved by abstract analysis’.⁴

It was the feelings that these hopes had been disappointed that allowed the anti-nuclear-weapons movements in both countries to emerge.

In both countries, the debates about nuclear weapons created, in different sections of society, very similar sentiments of a lack of representation of their experiences of the political process, in particular between their desire for security, on the one hand, and an international system and government policies that seemed to further death and destruction, on the other. J. B. Priestley expressed the feelings of many when he wrote that the MPs who had made the decision for nuclear weapons were ‘surrounded by an atmosphere of power

politics, intrigue, secrecy and insane invention'.⁵ The activists believed that the normal political channels no longer sufficed to express their political aims. Yet the ways in which the activists framed and voiced their experiences were not entirely new departures. The activists brought with them their own cultural assumptions, which were still connected to their individual life worlds. The movements were, therefore, not merely the expressions of insecurity in the nuclear age. **(p.89)** They also offered the activists communities that created interpersonal security. While the structures of the debates in Britain and West Germany were quite similar, they differed in their meanings and the exact contents.

Intellectuals

The entire CND executive until the early 1960s was a revival of the extra-parliamentary progressive movements, groupings, and 'think tanks' that had mushroomed in Britain during the 1930s.⁶ Although its members rarely explicitly called themselves members of an 'elite', they were carried by the belief that their reasonableness and education would ensure that they represented disinterested values. They believed that these values would allow them to reconcile the interest claims within the British population to what they regarded as the 'general will'.⁷ They now applied the civilizing mission that they had previously demanded in the context of British Empire to their home country; modes of colonial knowledge were applied to construct a vision of domestic British culture during the cold war.⁸ West German intellectuals and scientists, by observing the British campaign, applied this civilizing gaze to their own campaign, and also conceived of it as a mission to civilize and democratize the young West German democracy.

The activities of some of those engaged in the first CND executive can be linked to the tradition of post-Victorian intellectuals who regarded themselves as 'public moralists' and assumed that they had to school the citizens in the necessary public and private virtues, thus pulling the nation along the road of moral progress. Affluence, shielding 'the masses' from the challenge of dealing with the nuclear threat, appeared to make this path increasingly unlikely.⁹ And yet, the 'public moralists' within CND were uneasy about the appeal of their campaign. In his autobiography, the journalist and CND activist Mervyn Jones recalls watching the columns **(p.90)** gather for the final day of the 1959 Aldermaston March together with the editor of the *New Statesman*, Kingsley Martin. As he stared at the thousands of people, Martin asked Jones: 'What on earth are we going to do with all these people?'¹⁰

A look at the biographies of the members of the first CND executive committee illustrates this interpretation. CND's first chairman, the Canon of St Paul's Cathedral in London, John Collins, had been involved in the group Christian Action, which aimed at spreading the Gospel within a society that he perceived as increasingly secular and godless. The group urged the application of the

Christian principle of charity in domestic and international politics. Collins had, together with Trevor Huddleston and Michal Scott, been involved in anti-apartheid campaigns in South Africa over the course of the 1960s.¹¹

The editor of the *New Statesman*, Kingsley Martin, born in 1897, was the son of a pacifist Victorian minister and had participated in earlier peace protests.¹² The Labour politician Michael Foot, born in 1913 and thus one of the youngest member of the Executive Committee, was editor of the *Tribune*, the newspaper of the Labour Left.¹³ The writer J. B. Priestley, born in 1894, and his wife, the archaeologist Jacquetta Hawkes, were socially conscious intellectuals.¹⁴ He drew extensively on the utopian strands of nineteenth-century forms of socialism, which were the product of middle-class compassion rather than proletarian resentment.¹⁵

CND's president Bertrand Russell, born in 1872, then in his eighties and in his position until 1960, could look back not only on its earlier involvement in anti-nuclear protests, but on a whole political life that had been characterized by a reluctance to use the traditional political machinery.¹⁶ He had been imprisoned during the First World War for an article on peace that was deemed to be seditious, and he had advocated pacifism in the 1930s.¹⁷ Now, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, he felt that he **(p.91)** had to become involved, since 'our mood was like that of St Jerome and St Augustine watching the fall of the Roman Empire and the crumbling of a civilization which had seemed as indestructible as granite'.¹⁸ Peggy Duff, the organizing secretary of CND, had moved from one radical cause to another, covering 'Save Europe Now', social reform, and capital punishment before becoming active in CND.¹⁹

Victor Gollancz, born in 1893—himself active in many other extra-parliamentary movements—agreed to become a sponsor of the Campaign.²⁰ He had launched the Left Book Club in 1936, had supported the 'popular front', and had been involved in the British campaign for famine relief in central Europe immediately after 1945.²¹ Particularly remarkable is the example of Lord Simon of Wythenshawe (born in 1879), a Manchester industrialist and social reformer, president of Manchester CND, and for a short time treasurer of the national CND.²² He wrote in his *Nuclear Diary*: 'I was free of executive work and decided that the nuclear problem was incomparably more serious than my favourite population problem or anything else.'²³

Similar patterns can also be seen with other members of the first executive. Richard Acland, born in 1906, was co-opted later. The eldest son of Sir Francis Acland MP, he had, as a Liberal MP from 1935 onwards, been involved in the popular front activities of the 1930s. He held devout religious views that were the source of his political commitment and had been, together with Priestley, co-founder of the Common Wealth Party.²⁴ The party had been created to fill at least partially the vacuum caused by Labour's adherence to an electoral truce

with the Conservatives during the Second World War: Peggy Duff had been the party's organizer, Kingsley Martin had expressed an interest, and J. B. Priestley was one of the party's co-founders.²⁵ CND's early executive thus almost looked like a reincarnation of the Common Wealth Party.

(p.92) Donald Soper, a devout Methodist, born in 1903, formerly an active member of the Temperance Society, who had joined the Labour Party and the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) in 1937, was also co-opted to CND's executive later. Similarly, the Oxford historian A. J. P. Taylor, born in 1906, could look back on a life on the left of British politics. When active in CND, he had only recently published the *The Trouble Makers*, his Oxford Ford lectures on the tradition of radical dissent in British foreign policy. He wrote in his memoirs that, on joining CND, he 'had Bright and Cobden much in mind ... I wanted to show that like them I understood the practical case for nuclear bombs as well as their advocates did, indeed better'.²⁶ And some reviewers of the book agreed: 'Taylor himself is a troublemaker.'²⁷ In the 1930s and in the 1940s, as in CND's time in the late 1950s, many of these dissenting idealists had been part of a rather uneasy coalition of short-lived organizations and campaigns, often in connection with campaigns for a 'popular front' against European fascism in the 1930s, in particular the Left Book Club,²⁸ of Christian groups of social reform around William Temple, or nonconformist circles.²⁹ Links to previous radical movements also existed on the regional and local levels. Mrs Malvin Side, from Hampstead Garden Suburb, who attended all Aldermaston Marches until the early 1970s, had started her political career at 14 as a suffragette follower of Sylvia Pankhurst.³⁰ Hodgess Roper, the co-chairman of the University Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at Oxford in the 1960s, equally came from a 'radical middle class' background.³¹

The prominence of such left-wing intellectuals and groups had been boosted by Labour's election victory in 1945. Yet their members' hopes for a reordering of domestic and international society in order to prevent future wars and economic crises were soon shattered, as such visions of a socialist commonwealth, of planning, and of establishing Britain as the core of a 'third force' between the two superpowers rapidly lost credence with the apparently aggressive policies of the Soviet Union in Eastern **(p.93)** Europe.³² When cold war tensions appeared to subside in the wake of the Geneva Conference in 1955 and when the Soviet Union started to send out signals of 'peaceful coexistence', these ideas were able to regain some of their original appeal. Processes of societal change that characterized domestic political discussions added a further dimension to the original organizers' desires to campaign for social and political change. The growing affluence in British society after the end of rationing in 1954 seemed to them to destroy the very bases on which such a reordering might rest: urgent action was, therefore, required.³³

Although West German activists faced a profoundly different situation, given that most direct links to socialist traditions had been violently interrupted by the National dictatorship, the West German movements also relied initially on a group of academics and left-wing intellectuals who sought to educate the public. This happened in direct engagement with the framework of a civilizing mission that their British colleagues had applied. On 4 April 1957, West German scientists issued a declaration that highlighted this theme. In it, eighteen science professors from the University of Göttingen, among them Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Otto Hahn, Max Born, and Friedrich von Laue, stressed their responsibility for 'possible consequences of scientific research' and rejected participation in future research for nuclear weapons for the Federal Army. They thus evoked not only their scientific responsibilities, but also their political responsibilities as citizens. The statement followed the stationing of American short-range nuclear missile batteries in April 1957 and the emergence of institutionalized nuclear research in the Federal Republic.³⁴ In particular, the scientists criticized Chancellor Adenauer's statement that tactical nuclear weapons were but an advanced form of artillery as 'ignorant'.³⁵ They thus applied the same language and arguments that the British physicist Joseph Rotblat, as well as Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell had used in their statements on the nuclear issue:³⁶ their own declaration against purchasing nuclear equipment for the West German army argued by juxtaposing **(p.94)** pure scientific rationality with the dangers of political power and authority in the nuclear age. Like their British counterparts, West German scientists and intellectuals sought to universalize and make public their private moral norms. Their personal political involvement thus became an act of public philanthropy.³⁷ Only through a holistic application of moral norms could the dangers of nuclear weapons be avoided. Such moral knowledge could be created only through a campaign of 'education', for which the scientists would act as the intellectual leaders.³⁸

The scientists who drafted the Göttingen Declaration thus shaped a new mode of political intervention in post-war West German politics, whereas Adenauer stressed the political nature of his decision and insisted on the differentiation of the political system. The scientists a mode of public commitment through rational discussion, critical decision, and the opening-up of decision-making to democratic scrutiny through the application of seemingly universal norms that Jürgen Habermas would later theorize in his book on the public sphere.³⁹ It appealed especially to those Protestant scientists and scholars, such as Georg Picht and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, who were already open to holistic ideas through their engagement with life reform movements.⁴⁰ Only a minority of British scientists regarded science as endowed with a social function and an important role in social change.⁴¹

The West German scientists' statements were linked to transnational initiatives for nuclear disarmament by the scientific community, such as the manifesto by the physicist Albert Einstein and the philosopher Bertrand Russell from 1955, which urged for a peace initiative beyond the boundaries of the cold war and led to the foundation of the Pugwash Conferences in July 1957.⁴² The participants in the Pugwash Conferences, founded in **(p.95)** the wake of the manifesto by Professor Joseph Rotblat, regarded themselves as members of an international association of scientific discussion that would lead to a thaw beyond the Iron Curtain rather than as directly related to the connections between nuclear armaments and democracy in different nations.⁴³ In West Germany, the manifesto found echoes in the Mainau Declaration of Nobel Prize winners of May 1955 and the declaration of the Association of German Physics Societies (*Verband deutscher physikalischer Gesellschaften*) of 26 September 1955, which contained statements against nuclear energy in general and which assumed scientists' special responsibilities with regard to sensible use of nuclear energy.⁴⁴

The resonance that the scientists' arguments had in West Germany can be gleaned from the name the mass media gave the scientists: 'Göttingen 18'. Most of the scientists were indeed affiliated to the Göttingen Max Planck Institute, which had been among the very first research institutions to resume research on the application of nuclear energy after the Allied ban on nuclear research had been relaxed. The title alluded to the manifesto of the 'Göttingen 7' of November 1837, which had resulted in the expulsion of seven famous professors from their university posts after they had endorsed certain liberal aims that tapped traditions of German liberal democracy.⁴⁵ Like German scientists in the 1920s, and like the public intellectuals in CND, the Göttingen scientists saw themselves as educators of the public.⁴⁶ Yet, unlike in Britain, these academics were not instrumental in setting up the West German campaign, but primarily provided it with legitimacy.⁴⁷

Yet, although they claimed to be 'apolitical', they issued a political prescriptions for West Germany's health by advocating the renunciation of nuclear weapons.⁴⁸ The 'politics of the past' played a role in their involvement as well: most of the scientists had been involved in state-sponsored research projects during the National Socialist period, **(p.96)** and they felt that only international involvement and moral language could help them to become reintegrated into the international physics community.⁴⁹ In this self-interpretation, much popularized in Robert Jungk's account *Brighter than a Thousand Suns*, German scientists could appear as untainted by any involvement in the National Socialist regime: unlike scientists in other countries, they had made the moral decision to refuse working with the government to develop nuclear weapons.⁵⁰

While the majority of West German intellectuals played not an active role, but mainly a representative one, in the foundation of the protests, an exception was the Munich Committee against Atomic Armaments (*Komitee gegen Atomrüstung*), which had been founded by the essayist and writer Hans Werner Richter and resembled CND in form and social structure. The Committee's membership file reads like a list of the Munich intelligentsia and of the educated bourgeoisie, with the politicians Hildegard Hamm-Brücher (from the liberal *Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)*), Hans-Jochen Vogel (*SPD*), the left Catholic intellectual Carl Amery, and a number of Munich booksellers, publishers, and editors.⁵¹ Moreover, Richter managed to attract a group of politically active writers whom he knew from the literary circle *Gruppe 47* (literally 'Group 47'), which he had helped to found in 1947. In many of his letters and lectures, the 'liberalization' of West German political culture and the immunization against the dangers from right-wing groupings formed the leading arguments.⁵² In an odd mixture of social elitism and critical aims, they regarded themselves as intellectuals who could provide society with memory and moral guidance.⁵³ Yet, in terms of numbers, these public intellectuals were rather marginal in the extra-parliamentary politics of security. In both countries, the vast majority of supporters joined the movements because they felt that their desires for security were not adequately represented by either the labour movements, or the churches.

(p.97) Christians on the move

The experiences of a clash between personal experiences and expectations were particularly pronounced among British and West German Christians. A minority of Christians in both countries increasingly felt that institutionalized religion failed to live up to its fundamental tenets in an age of potential nuclear war.⁵⁴ The protests against nuclear weapons offered Christian activists an alternative home in which they could translate their fears into demands for security. The general context within which Christians framed their expectations was the belief, first codified by St Augustine as a norm for individual judgements of conscience, that wars fought by Christians had to be 'just', in terms of both their causes and their military practices.⁵⁵ Mass warfare, in particular the bombing of cities in the Second World War and the destructive power of nuclear weapons, put the doctrine under increasing strain. Protestant Churches in both Britain and West Germany as well as on the global ecumenical level condemned nuclear weapons in the most drastic terms.⁵⁶ As the Anglican Church was part of the fabric of the English state, and because of the traditional proximity of German Protestantism towards government as well as the close relationship between the Catholic hierarchy and the West German Adenauer government, official opposition to nuclear weapons from these groups remained rather ambivalent and subdued: this only helped accentuate many Anglicans' disappointment with their church's stance. There were, in fact, only about twelve 'unilateralist bishops and suffragans in England and Wales', out of over a hundred—namely,

those from Manchester, Hulme, Birmingham, Chichester, Southwark, Llandaff, Bangor, Plymouth, and Woolwich.⁵⁷

A minority of Christians in Britain and West Germany were increasingly dissatisfied with the ambivalent official stance of their church institutions towards what they regarded as the fundamental issue of security. **(p.98)** Canon Collins expressed the feelings of many British and West German activists when he wondered how 'a Christian or a liberal man or woman [could] stand such a denial of the basic rule that only love can expel fear?'⁵⁸ In Britain, this unease had already begun to take shape during the Second World War, when the Royal Air Force had started to bomb German civilian targets during the night, and had been galvanized into a movement against aerial bombing under the leadership of George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, who was also a vocal advocate of unilateral nuclear disarmament.⁵⁹ In West Germany, a general scepticism towards Catholic Adenauer's foreign and defence policies added to their unease.⁶⁰ Paradoxically, both Protestant and Catholic activists in West Germany thus shared some of the same assumptions about the dangerous proximity between the Catholic Church and the Adenauer government, with *secular* critics of the 'CDU state' among the supporters. In particular, younger Catholics in West Germany became increasingly dissatisfied with the disjuncture between Catholic moral norms, on the one hand, and, on the other, the political reality of German Catholicism, which entertained close links with the Adenauer government.⁶¹

But the pronouncedly Protestant activists were not only dissatisfied with the ways in which their churches addressed questions that they regarded as of supreme ethical importance. Fundamentally, their engagement in the campaigns is also an indication of the core fact that the churches had lost their ability to create a valid explanation of society and to act as an ethical guide to politics. They wanted to resurrect this claim. This shift was especially pronounced in the West German Protestant Church. In its 'formula of impotence' ('Ohnmachtsformal') that was supposed to solve the stand-off between the more conservative Lutherans and the more progressive sections within the church, it stated explicitly that it was, even within itself, unable to produce one valid explanation.⁶² This **(p.99)** was especially vexing for clergymen such as Martin Niemöller who regarded their own involvement as one of a constant battle for influence in society and, thus, a direct continuation of the *Kirchenkampf*, the battle against the Nazification of the Protestant Church during the Third Reich. Such a stance required a constant commitment to the practice of conscience and the reform of society as a whole. Paradoxically, it was the failure of this position to assert itself within the Protestant Church in West Germany that allowed Christians to merge political and religious meanings of activism and thus fuse political and religious languages.⁶³

There was no agreement about what practical consequences should be drawn from the analysis of the nuclear arms race. The majority in the churches' hierarchy believed that, given the communist threat, nuclear deterrence might be admissible.⁶⁴ Hence, while the British Council of Churches condemned nuclear weapons as 'an offence to God and a denial of His purpose for man', it called British unilateral disarmament 'impracticable and possibly disastrous'.⁶⁵ For many Christian activists, the demonstrations and annual marches thus turned into Christian processions, a 'heyday of their personal evangelism of mankind and the victory of Christian morality', and into practices of Christian brotherhood and fellowship that they believed had been lost in society more generally.⁶⁶

Conversely, the West German Catholic Walter Dirks expressed the feelings of many British and West German activists when he claimed that church support for nuclear armaments would lead to 'nightmare[s]' for the faithful.⁶⁷ This position was grounded in the belief that 'security' could be created only through active Christian works in the world, 'not in fine sermons, but in action'.⁶⁸ This reflected a very specific theological world view. For many activists, the Incarnation was at the very centre of the Christian belief system. The incarnate Christ had shattered the boundaries between spiritual and physical worlds. Thus, addressing humanity's **(p.100)** physical needs and working towards preventing its destruction were spiritual acts. Christian action was, therefore, not only about religion; it related to the world as a whole: 'Beware lest you worship the Satan of Separation and not the God who came to earth to die between two thieves to save.'⁶⁹

Official Catholic responses were strongly framed by the Pope's position on the matter, which combined a general condemnation of nuclear weapons with a tolerance towards deterrence policies and an emphasis on private faith.⁷⁰ Because of the specific conception of the Catholic Church as both a faith and a transnational organization, Catholics faced the question of disenchantment especially clearly. The key global reference point for discussions about nuclear weapons in the 1950s and early 1960s was, as for Protestants, the doctrine of 'just wars': wars could be justified, if their causes and the means with which they were waged were just. The official reading of this doctrine sought to depoliticize the issue by claiming that its anti-communist position made the Western stance in the cold war just, as it helped preserve the freedom of religion within which the Catholic Church could develop.⁷¹

An earlier attempt to re-create the 'Peace Federation of German Catholics' along explicitly political lines had failed in the early 1950s.⁷² This had left a small group of Catholics who sought to combine political and religious commitment. They organized small-scale protests against nuclear weapons at the meetings of the Catholic laymen's association (the so-called *Katholikentage*) in 1956 and 1958, for example, by bringing a model nuclear rocket to the respective venue.⁷³

Moreover, through their journals *Werkhefte* and *Frankfurter Hefte*, some West German Catholics (**p.101**) sought to revive their plans to establish a more critical form of social Catholicism than the one represented by the CDU in West German society.⁷⁴ Some Catholics, like Christel Beilmann (1921–2005) and Arno Klönne (born 1931), both with backgrounds in Catholic youth movements, held prominent organizational positions in the Easter Marches. But most Catholics critical of the official nuclear armaments policy, especially those with functions in the state, stayed away from the demonstrations because they feared to be reprimanded by their local bishops.⁷⁵ Only John XXIII's 1963 encyclical *Pacem in terris* (1963) created the conditions for more Catholics to feel able to join the Easter Marches.⁷⁶

From a Christian perspective, the movement became, in the words of a British activist, 'necessary not chiefly to save our skins but to save our souls.'⁷⁷ The Christian activists were thus driven not by the loss of their beliefs, but rather by the desire to generate 'security' through the re-Christianization of their societies, thus returning to their dreams of transformation of the immediate post-war years to create thoroughly non-violent and just international and domestic societies after the ravages of the Second World War.⁷⁸

The activists' religiosity was not only conditioned by official interpretations of the revelation. It relied primarily on people's own experiences of the world. On the one hand, Christian activists emphasized their individual experiences and moral norms against the Church hierarchies and thus 'privatized' their religious beliefs. On the other hand, however, they believed that these private beliefs should be taken seriously in the politics of security and that religion should play a role in the deliberations of social justice.⁷⁹ This was not merely a transition towards 'believing without (**p.102**) belonging', or the abandonment of the Churches in an age of affluence.⁸⁰ Rather, their beliefs carried the activists into communities that did not coincide with the institutionalized churches.⁸¹ The movements provided the spaces for activists to leave their specific milieu and to apply their politics of security to their image of society as a whole. They sought to practise a far more wide-ranging conception of Christian activities than the ones condoned by the official churches and regarded their participation in the campaigns as its realization.⁸²

Although this politicization of religious experiences occurred in both British and West German protests, the process obtained a particular political resonance in West Germany. The most vocal Protestant opponents of Adenauer's nuclear policies were the Brethren (*Kirchliche Bruderschaften*), who had emerged as bodies of clergymen promoting Christian fellowship against the National Socialist regime and had already played an important role in the protests against conventional rearmaments in the first half of the 1950s.⁸³ They regarded the challenge posed by nuclear armaments as very similar to the one posed by the Third Reich. Confessing and bearing witness and thus transcending the material

world had different implications here. Although there were discussions about the bombing war and the role of the churches in resistance movements in Britain, these issues possessed a far greater immediacy than in Germany. The memories of mass violence from the Second World War meant that many older West German Protestants involved in the campaigns still resorted to biological language when recalling their experiences of the Second World War and linking it to the expected horrors of nuclear warfare: Combatants no longer fought to protect civilians; instead they treated them as 'insects deserving extermination ... For the past forty years we have been talking of total war.'⁸⁴ Nuclear weapons would force enemy states to treat each other 'in the same manner that Hitler and Stalin dealt with their domestic opposition: by wholesale slaughter'.⁸⁵

(p.103) By linking their activities against 'atomic death' to bearing witness for 'German guilt', West German Christians in the protests confessed their past wrongdoings, but simultaneously sought to free themselves from the web of responsibilities in which they had become entangled. This would, they believed, show 'our inhumanity', but would also offer 'atonement for the rebirth of mankind'.⁸⁶ Even for those who had been too young to have been involved in the National Socialist regime, this transcendence offered shelter from the knowledge of the most recent history. While the majority of Protestants believed that the issue had been solved with the Stuttgart Confession of Guilt (*Stuttgarter Schuldbekennntnis*) of the Protestant Church in Germany (*Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKiD)*), those engaged with the anti-nuclear-weapons movement held that this confession was a continuous process.⁸⁷ Catholics involved in the West German movements also thought that it was necessary to atone constantly for National Socialist crimes. Their beliefs thus clashed with the official view of a Catholic *ecclesia triumphans* (triumphant Church) that had survived the National Socialist regime institutionally and morally intact.⁸⁸

Labour on the March

Such desires to create security through new forms of political engagement not only occurred in the Christian Churches. The politically most important and immediate motivations behind the British and the West German movements were linked to experiences of the social-democratic, socialist, and communist left in both countries. In a process that lasted through the 1950s, many labour movement supporters, albeit for very different reasons, came to think that the cold war and the nuclear arms race seriously hampered their social and cultural aspirations and projects.⁸⁹ In particular, they came to the realization that their parties as organizations were unable to represent their interests, experiences, hopes, and dreams. Instead, as part and parcel of programmatic reformism, the parties had **(p.104)** appeared to follow policies that clearly separated international relations and domestic reconstruction and that seemed to carry the cold war into the centre of party-political life. Over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, the social-democratic parties in both countries came to advocate international policies that were quite similar to those suggested by the centre-

right parties, while shifting their attention towards advocating moderate social reforms in the domestic political arena. These changes were epitomized by the *SPD*'s moderate Bad Godesberg Programme from 1959 and Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell's call for the abolition of clause IV of the Labour programme, which still demanded the nationalization of all industries.

What the reformists saw as a necessary step to rid the party of unnecessary traditions, the left-wing groups within the *SPD* regarded as an 'undue assimilation to existing power structures'.⁹⁰ Rather than being carried by processes of social change and the growth of affluence, they had a rather ambiguous relationship to these processes. They believed that affluence depoliticized the population and lulled them into an artificial confidence that international politics did not have an impact on their private lives. Only direct personal engagement in these issues could help prevent catastrophe.⁹¹ Similarly, communists in Britain and West Germany derided their leadership for not taking a principled stance on nuclear weapons. At the same time, the organizational structures within the British and West German labour movements left increasingly little scope for expressing these experiences.⁹² In Britain, John Osborne, a dramatist, expressed the feelings of many against the Labour leader when he wrote that he 'carried a knife in my heart for ... you Gaitskell, you particularly'.⁹³

While these structural developments were quite similar, the *form* of these processes in Britain and the Federal Republic differed. In Britain, only parts of the Labour Party endorsed CND, with the exception of the vote at the Scarborough conference in 1960, which was soon reversed in 1961. The historically most important and long-lasting processes of dissociation took place outside the Labour Party and within the Communist **(p.105)** Party of Great Britain (CPGB). In West Germany, by contrast, this coalition of left-wing groups enjoyed the backing of the *SPD* until the beginning of the 1960s and thus had a direct link to political decision-making. The division of Germany further complicated the issues. Because of the importance of anti-communism in West German political culture, processes of dissociation had fundamental repercussions.

Dissatisfaction with the cold war consensus in the political culture of the Labour Party and the organizational stubbornness of the CPGB executive formed, from the very beginning, the crucial context for the emergence and framing of the British movement. In the Labour Party, the polarities of the cold war had helped to produce an alliance between party leaders and the trade union right after 1945, which stabilized inner-party conflicts. CND was one of the remnants of the broader social coalition that underpinned some of Labour's policies during the 1930s and particularly during the Labour government from 1945 to 1951 and that now campaigned outside the party.⁹⁴ This alliance had been forged during the Second World War, but broke down with the first Labour government in the

early 1950s. The involvement of the professional middle class in the Labour Party had been strongly linked to its ethic of service and expertise in pursuit of humanitarian ends, and in its civilizing mission at home and abroad.⁹⁵

The Labour leadership's neglect of the links between international and domestic security and its embrace of certain features of affluent society in search for a broader voter base appeared to contradict these experiences of many grass-roots members and party intellectuals alike. They believed that, as the Labour Left's *Tribune* put it in 1959, the people needed 'to be reminded of the ideals they prized fourteen years ago'.⁹⁶

It was the break-up of this consensus that made many Labour supporters campaign on behalf of CND.⁹⁷ The matter of nuclear weapons had already become an issue as early as 1954 when a small group of Labour MPs under Fenner Brockway's leadership formed the Hydrogen Bomb National Campaign Committee after the government's decision to acquire hydrogen bombs was made public in Britain.⁹⁸ The discussions **(p.106)** about a reformist party programme and about abandoning Clause IV further weakened the consensus from the mid-1950s onwards as activists felt increasingly poorly represented by the leadership.⁹⁹

The rhetoric of cold war antagonism was no longer sufficient to guaranteeing a majority alliance between party leaders, trade unions, and ordinary members. The 1959 congress of the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) carried a unilateralist resolution, and, although the vote was reversed at a subsequent congress, it indicated that the unilateralist cause of seeing domestic and international security as intimately connected might attract support from beyond the traditional left.¹⁰⁰ Hugh Gaitskell's antagonistic style of leadership exacerbated the tensions further. The unions previously associated with the Labour Left also moved towards unilateralism: the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) all backed unilateralist resolutions. Accordingly, delegates rejected official defence policy proposals at the 1960 Labour Party conference in Scarborough.¹⁰¹ Although the vote was reversed in 1961, unilateralist sentiment in the trade unions and among the supporters remained strong.¹⁰²

Some constituency Labour Party activists continued to support forms of unilateralism at the national conferences, particularly against American tests, American overflights, and the stationing of US *Polaris* submarine-based missiles at Holy Loch in Scotland.¹⁰³ Unlike the West German labour movement, however, the British Labour Party was nonetheless able to reintegrate activists into its fold. Despite accusations of being communist fellow travellers, activists never had to fear a ban.¹⁰⁴ Especially under the leadership of the more amenable Harold Wilson from 1963 onwards, many Labour supporters from

within CND rejoined the mainstream of the party.¹⁰⁵ Even after Wilson had betrayed his unilateral credentials after **(p.107)** the 1964 Labour general election victory, activists remained loath to leave the party altogether.¹⁰⁶

The shift towards reformism and an increasing acceptance of capitalism among the Labour mainstream also set in train processes of dissociation among socialist and Labour student groups, which came to be at the core of many grass-roots anti-nuclear-weapons protests.¹⁰⁷ The 1956 intervention of the conservative Eden government in Suez and the merely lukewarm protests of the Labour Party had already left many student sections dissatisfied. Conditions in the Oxford University Labour Club were particularly prone to change, as a group of students, among them also some disaffected communists, sought to create a vision of a socialist future for a Britain without nuclear weapons and a world order that went beyond the cold war.¹⁰⁸ Activists in the group rejected both Labour reformism and what they believed were the structural constraints of orthodox Marxism. Particularly prominent were the Canadian Rhodes scholar and Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PPE) student Charles Taylor, who had already co-founded the local Hydrogen Bomb Campaign Committee in 1954, and the Caribbean Rhodes scholar Stuart Hall, who provided connections between the local CND and the anti-colonial movement. By launching the journal *Universities and Left Review (ULR)*, activists sought to spread their ideas. The group's basis soon extended beyond Oxford, and its focus shifted to London and the metropolitan political culture.¹⁰⁹ There developed a whole culture, mainly metropolitan in shape, of coffee houses and bookshops, in which students and young activists gathered and discussed the political issues of the day.¹¹⁰

Of key importance for the political debates within CND were also those activists who had become alienated from the CPGB. They had, after their protests against the Stalinist line taken by the leadership after the Soviet invasion in Hungary and after the revelation of Stalin's **(p.108)** purges in the 1930s, founded the journal *Reasoner* (later renamed the *New Reasoner*) to further discussions within the CPGB. After they had left or been expelled from the CPGB, they joined forces with the group of students around the *ULR* when the journal of both groups merged to form the *New Left Review (NLR)* in 1960.¹¹¹

This opened up Marxism for wider influence within the British left and ultimately led to the dissociation of many students into what they called the New Left, later one of the main support groups of CND and, in particular, the Committee of 100.¹¹² These movement activists were particularly influential in CND branches in the north of England and in Fife, Scotland, particularly after the *Polaris* missiles had been stationed on Holy Loch in 1962. The historians Edward P. Thompson and John Saville were the New Left's most vocal spokesmen and activists.¹¹³

While it is true, as Eric Hobsbawm observed, that CND had in itself 'nothing to do with the crisis in the CP', the political context in which CND emerged and the cultural traditions on which it drew cannot be explained without reference to the many activists who joined CND from the ranks of the ex-communist New Left.¹¹⁴ After the tremendous shock of Krushchev's revelations about Stalin's atrocities in his 'Secret Speech' at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union's Communist Party (CPSU) and after the violent suppression of the Hungarian uprising by Soviet forces, activists around the *Reasoner* and *New Reasoner* and, then, in the New Left campaigned for a realization of their hopes and dreams of a truly humane and socialist policy. They did this by seeking to revitalize communist politics from within by providing fora for discussions. But the CPGB clamped down on dissent within the party, so that activists were pushed out of the moral community that the party had provided them.¹¹⁵ Looking back to what became the origins of the New Left, John Saville remarked that 'the idea of resigning from the Communist Party was not in our minds when we began the *Reasoner* and it was only in the following **(p.109)** months that we recognized, with great reluctance, the fundamental conservatism, not only of the leadership, but also of the rank and file'.¹¹⁶

CND provided an ideal context from which this New Left could try to translate its ideas into practice. But the transition from identifying themselves as 'communist' to turning to 'New Left' activism, however, was far more complicated than is usually suggested and did not necessarily involve a complete break from previous orthodoxies. An important part of British communism consisted of a shared sense of purpose and the feeling of mutual sacrifice by party members for the cause. This was only heightened by the social and political isolation that many communists experienced in cold war Britain. Coming to terms with the exclusion from their community (which most of them had not planned) and with the sudden collapse of the boundaries that had given their political and social world meaning was a process that took years rather than months.¹¹⁷

For Thompson, this project consisted of promoting a 'socialist humanism' that involved linking politics and culture in novel ways. It involved what he saw as the reconstitution of the emancipatory aspects of the socialist tradition, but in new moral terms. In other words, Thompson rejected the bureaucratic form that socialism had taken in Eastern Europe after 1945. Instead, he sought to revitalize socialism in moral terms by stressing what one might call the libertarian elements of socialism: to enable everyone to live freely. And he connected this to a message that highlighted the specifically *national* importance of socialism in England. He argued that these aspects had characterized the history of the English labour movement from its very beginnings and was deeply entrenched in English national identity. This evocation of tradition, also visible in Thompson's 1963 classic *The Making of the English Working Class*, bypassed

both the anti-humanism of orthodox Communism and Trotskyism as well as the voluntaristic renderings of contemporary liberalism.¹¹⁸

Yet, Thompson and others still presumed, like historical materialists, that socialism was the guaranteed outcome of the historical process, a vision towards which the younger group around the *ULR* was more sceptical.¹¹⁹ **(p.110)** Thompson's aim was to enable ethical moral subjects, which would not act as part of a bureaucratic or governmental machinery, or blindly follow the ideological consensus, but which would take decisions on the basis of their own conscience. Although New Left activists did not regard themselves as religious, much of their rhetoric and world views appears to have been influenced by their nonconformist background, with the emphasis on conscience and individual moral responsibilities: Christopher Hill's and Edward Thompson's families were Methodists, and Dorothy Thompson's family was of Huguenot descent. The academic and activist Ralph Milliband, the young historian Raphael Samuel, and Hyman Levy came from progressive Jewish backgrounds.¹²⁰

Their war experiences and the hopes and dreams for socialist transformation in the immediate post-war period played a crucial role for the New Left activists, and it was the ground from which they sought to capture the lived utopias of the 1930s.¹²¹ It was really during the war that Thompson discovered his Marxism—his father had been a missionary, then an Oxford academic, possibly of a liberal imperialist orientation, if one wants to use this term. Thompson's war service during 1942 to 1945 included stints in northern Africa, Italy, and Austria, where he fought as a tank troop leader. There, he came to see war as a stifling anonymous force and structure that worked against human agency—a trope that we can find in many other war memoirs, not only of British soldiers, and that Thompson later in the 1950s applied to the cold war. In 1947, Thompson and his mother visited Bulgaria, where his deceased brother was a hero. He spent the late summer of that year as commandant of the British Youth Brigade, volunteers engaged in the construction of a 150-mile railway across the Sava in Slovenia. He wrote about this in ways that brought his earlier war experiences together with his interpretation of socialism as practice.¹²²

His socialism was, therefore, from the late 1940s onwards, already framed by an element that would, in the context of 1956, lead to his expulsion from the Communist Party: his critique of the impersonality of party and government structures, and the stress on socialist community and individual and popular agency. The campaign against the bomb nuclear weapons could, therefore, fulfil a similar function: 'The bomb must **(p.111)** be dismantled; but in dismantling it, men will summon up energies which will open the way to their inheritance. The bomb is like an image of man's whole predicament: it bears within it death and life, total destruction or human mastery over human history.'¹²³

In contrast to developments in West Germany and despite its tradition in the anti-militarist campaigns of the 1930s, the CPGB itself only endorsed the protests officially in 1960 after it had become clear that CND was a success. The Party never wielded substantial influence in the campaign during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Before that, the CPGB had campaigned for 'world peace' and multilateral disarmament through the British Peace Committee and regarded the foundation of CND, with its agenda of unilateral disarmament, as a distraction from the 'battle for world peace'. In line with the Soviet Union's position of 'peaceful coexistence', the CPGB saw its main business as multilateral disarmament through international summit negotiations.¹²⁴

In West Germany, the dissonance between the political experiences and expectations of Labour movement activists also existed before the emergence of an anti-nuclear-weapons movement and explained why activists participated. As West Germany's *SPD* organized the first phase of the protests against nuclear weapons together with prominent trade union organizations and thus contained some of these dissonances within its organizational fold, it was the protesters' activism and assertion of an independent position within the *SPD*'s campaign that turned them into identifiable political actors.

To a much greater extent than in Britain, activism in the West German protests against nuclear weapons itself created the boundaries that made it possible that the activists' experiences could be perceived as distinct and homogeneous political positions. The dissonances were particularly pronounced among student groups and activists within the *SPD*'s traditional 'front organizations', which offered social and cultural activities, such as hiking and biking in a labour-movement context. As the Communist Party had been banned in Germany in 1956, the ex-communist left was far less important for the West German campaigns than for Britain. This left the Easter Marches, the second phase of the West German movement, as the only forum through which supporters could voice their concerns in public.

(p.112) Activists within the Socialist German Student Federation (*Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS)*), the *SPD*'s student organization, asserted their experiences particularly especially vocally. *SDS* activists' analysis of social and international security issues, however, found less and less space within the organizational boundaries of the *SPD*, as the party came to abandon its critique against Adenauer's foreign policy and moved towards a 'policy of commonalities' from late 1959 onwards.¹²⁵ Disagreeing with the *SPD*'s official line, the student activists continued to reject the Federal Republic's social order as politically regressive and to campaign for an 'independent' position in the cold war, not least to maintain German unity.¹²⁶ The emergence and identification of these dissonances as a political problem was directly related to the issue of nuclear armaments. Accusations of the protesters as pro-communist, although not absent in the British context, played

a much more salient role in West Germany, thus further increasing the boundaries between West German activists and the society surrounding them. With the election of Jürgen Seifert, a keen anti-nuclear-weapons campaigner and a prominent critic of the *SPD*'s reformist line, and others to the *SDS*'s executive in October 1958, the *SDS* expressed its scepticism towards a separation of individual experiences and international security policies that was gaining ground among the *SPD*'s party leadership.¹²⁷

The first visible ruptures between *SDS* activists and the *SPD* headquarters had, however, already occurred half a year earlier in Berlin, the front-line city of the cold war. On 15 April 1958, the Action Committee of the Berlin Youth against Atomic Death, sponsored by, among others, the *SDS* and the *SPD*'s youth organization 'Falcons', staged a silent march under the headline 'Remember Hiroshima'. After the Berlin press attacked the march as 'pro-communist', a heavy conflict within the Berlin section of the Campaign against Atomic Death emerged. Berlin's leader of the Federation of German Trade Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)*), Ernst Scharnowski, supported by the up-and-coming Willy Brandt, announced at a meeting that American nuclear weapons had not only ended the Second World War, but also guaranteed peace in Berlin, a **(p. 113)** position that contradicted the very rationale of the *SPD*'s Campaign against Atomic Death.¹²⁸

The clash between activists' own experiences and the *SPD*'s campaign organization came to a head when the autonomous Student Circles against Nuclear Armaments, which were closely linked to the *SDS*, planned, against the *SPD*'s wishes, a congress against nuclear weapons in Berlin in early 1959.¹²⁹ The congress took place on 3 January 1959 at the height of the Berlin crisis over Krushchev's ultimatum over the negotiations for the future of West Berlin. It passed a highly contentious resolution that called for immediate peace negotiations with the GDR and also adopted official GDR arguments for a German-German confederation.¹³⁰

While it is now clear that the resolution could be passed only through gerrymandering by *SDS* members with GDR connections around the student journal *konkret*,¹³¹ the broad support for the resolution among the participants still highlighted the increasing dissonance between the approach at the *SPD* headquarters and members' experiences.¹³² Rather than a manifestation of pro-communist attitudes, this labelling was itself a product of political communications at the time. It was an assertion of what the students felt to be their vital interests and experiences, and their impression that they were not properly represented by the *SPD*'s general policies.

In the following months and years, tensions intensified.¹³³ October 1961, Herbert Wehner, responsible for organizational questions in the *SPD* headquarters, tabled a 27-page dossier which sought to prove that the *SDS* had

become 'increasingly extremist' and suggested that simultaneous *SDS* and *SPD* membership was incompatible. The resolution was passed **(p.114)** after considerable discussions and published on 6 November 1961.¹³⁴ As the *SPD*'s organization served as marker for acceptable left-wing politics in the Federal Republic during this time period, this pushed *SDS* activists, against their will, outside the parameters of respectable politics. They now became, even more than they had been already, distinct and identifiable political actors. The Easter Marches were now the only forum in which *SDS* supporters could voice their concerns and practise their ideas, so that the marches increasingly became a reservoir for *SDS* protesters' political activism.¹³⁵

Contrary to contemporary perceptions and many historical interpretations, experiences of dissonance within the communist left mattered far less in the Federal Republic than in Britain.¹³⁶ As in the other groups, changing perceptions of the cold war and domestic politics combined in increasing the differences of experience between the communists and their milieu. Communist involvement in the West German protests against nuclear weapons is a hotly debated issue to the present day, and it is worthy to be explored in some detail. The German Communist Party had been banned since 1956, and communist agitation took place clandestinely in so-called 'camouflage organizations' (*Tarnorganisationen*), such as the *Fränkischer Kreis* (Franconian Circle) around the Würzburg Professor of Linguistics Franz Schneider, the *Deutscher Club 1954* around Wolfgang Harder, a professor of history at the Wuppertal Institute of Education, and, from 1960, the *Deutsche Friedens-Union*, a party set up under the leadership of Renate Riemeck, a professor at the Wuppertal Institute of Education, to gain support for the 'peace' policies of the GDR among the West German middle class.¹³⁷

Yet, as the GDR's policy increasingly moved away from revolutionary aims and from actively pursuing policies of German unification in the West, and as the nature of clandestine work put more and more pressure on West German communists, the majority of West German communists abandoned active politics, dissatisfied with the dissonances between **(p.115)** hyperbolic rhetoric from the East German regime and the lack of active policies.¹³⁸ Those who joined the West German movements were, therefore, far from 'unwitting assets' of the GDR. The vast majority of communists joined the marches independently as they searched for a forum in which they could express their experiences. Conversely, non-communist activists remarked positively that the old divisions between the two strands of the labour movement had been overcome and that a pragmatic alliance could take place in the light of the cold war perils.¹³⁹

The organizers who participated under instructions from GDR authorities were, therefore, increasingly dissatisfied with the coherence of communist activism.¹⁴⁰ Thus, viewed from a movement perspective, the participation of communists was an exercise in integration: the perceived boundaries between society and

'movement' came to be stronger than their identification as 'communist'. This is also demonstrated by the ways in which the government and the *SPD* labelled the marches. While the secret intelligence reports knew of the participation of individual communists, the official government statements suggested that communists and the Easter Marches were identical. It thus helped to sharpen the contours of the movement in the domestic political debate further and drew the small minority of communists and the majority of non-communists within the Easter Marches more closely together.¹⁴¹

Crucially, during this process of integration, communists further adapted their experiences and expectations and demilitarized their political language and insignia. Calls for 'human fellowship' now replaced the demands for a 'fight for peace', and violent behaviour in Communist theory and action, still widespread in the immediate post-war years, had disappeared almost completely. Unlike communist and socialist 'peace' activists in the Weimar Republic, communists now rejected military **(p.116)** forms of organization by juxtaposing pictures of civil and civilian life with images of marching soldiers.¹⁴²

The small socialist and highly localized groups of activists that sought to revive German socialist traditions through networks and journals over the course of the 1950s mattered more in West Germany than party politics, however. The importance of such journals lay in the fact that they provided forums for reviving within a small network positions that wished to create a 'third force' between communism and capitalism in world politics at a time when such positions were still outside the parameters of activism. Together, they provided the space from which a West German 'New Left' could emerge.¹⁴³ The most important of these journals were *Funken* ('Sparks', published 1949–59), published in Stuttgart by the former exile Fritz Lamm, *Die Andere Zeitung* ('The Alternative Paper'), and *Sozialistische Politik* ('Socialist Politics', 1954–66), edited by Peter von Oertzen and Theo Pirker from Bovenden near Göttingen in north-west Germany. For some activists, their involvement with the journals created the conditions from which they could think about challenging the very structure and form of the political in the Federal Republic.¹⁴⁴

Youth Movement Activists

While political and religious experiences of dissonance between experiences and expectations were the most important processes that contributed to the strength and composition of the British and West German movements, their particular shape was influenced by experiences within small socialist and religious life-reform groups, as they connected cultural activities with political engagement. Next to the socialist journals, they form a neglected strand within the genealogies of the West German New Left that found a political space in the West German protests against nuclear weapons. Such experiences were much weaker in Britain than in West Germany. Although they had a considerable impact on the history of the British Committee of 100, where traditions of life-

reform (**p.117**) movements, radical pacifism, and anarchism were revived, they were comparatively less important for CND. In the Federal Republic, by contrast, the experiences of activists coming from the front organizations of the *SPD* mattered greatly for the ways in which the marches came to be identified as seemingly homogeneous political actors. Their experiences had a far greater, albeit usually neglected, influence on the shape of the West German movements in the late 1950s and early 1960s than student activists. They were particularly strong in the Ruhr area and in the southern parts of Hesse.¹⁴⁵

By continuing to campaign against nuclear weapons even after the *SPD* headquarters and the trade unions started to abandon the campaign, activists from the Falcons (*Sozialistische Jugend. Die Falken*) and the Friends of Nature Youth (*Naturfreundejugend*) organizations expressed not only their deep concerns about nuclear armaments, but also their misgivings that they could no longer express these worries within their own organizations more generally. While they had formed an essential part of social-democratic and socialist lives in the 1920s, organizations such as the Falcons and the Friends of Nature had, after the reconstruction of the *SPD* after 1945, come to be on the sidelines of social-democratic politics as the party sought to appeal to a broader audience.¹⁴⁶

In West Germany in particular, many of the West German organizers and activists could look back on an involvement in (frequently male-dominated) youth movements or party youth organizations, often with Christian overtones.¹⁴⁷ Arno Klönne (born 1931), student of the political scientist Wolfgang Abendroth and later press secretary of the Easter Marches, had been involved in a *bündisch* Catholic youth group throughout the National Socialist years. After 1945, he was the head of a local group of the Catholic pupils' association *Neudeutschland*, which was independent of the official Federation of German Catholic Youth (*Bund der deutschen Katholischen Jugend*).¹⁴⁸ Christel Beilmann, Easter March (**p.118**) organizer in the Ruhr area, had been a Catholic girls' movement leader during the Second World War.¹⁴⁹

These activists were in constant osmosis with other groups that tried to revive the community spirit of the associations of the 1920s and 1930s. Thus, Theodor Ebert, later a theorist of non-violent direct action and involved in conscientious objectors' organizations, and Klaus Vack, later full-time organizer of the Easter Marches, could look back on an active involvement in the social-democratic Friends of Nature youth organizations. Andreas Buro, also in the Easter March executive, worked as a youth adviser (*Jugendpfleger*) in Kassel city council at the beginning of the 1960s.¹⁵⁰

Particularly remarkable for the Easter Marches was its relation to the group *d.j. 1.11*, originally founded by Eberhard Köbel 'Tusk' under right-wing auspices in the mid-1920s. Köbel had joined the Communist Party in 1932 and became a

member of the socialist resistance group Red Chapel (*Rote Kapelle*) around Harro Schulze-Boysen. During the 1940s, he left Germany for Sweden and Britain, where he established contacts to the fellow-travelling Free German Youth (*Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ)*) and became its chief propagandist in the Eastern zone of occupation in 1948 before being sacked in disgrace by the new GDR regime in 1951.¹⁵¹ The Easter Marches had shed the often aggressive and militarist style of the original *d.j.1.11* group and the Free German Youth. But Klönne revived ideas of male community and life-reform by republishing the *d.j. 1.11* journal *pläne* in 1956–57 as a student paper at the University of Münster in order to bring politics and youth groups together. At the end of the 1950s, members of working-class youth associations joined the magazine's editorial board. Among them were Herbert Faller, the head of the Friends of Nature youth association and later head of the Easter Marches in Hesse, Fred Gebhardt, an organizer for the Falcons, a socialist youth movement, and the Dortmund pupil and Falcon member (**p.119**) Frank Werkmeister, both involved in the Easter Marches in the Ruhr area.¹⁵²

pläne became the main Easter March journal in West Germany from 1961 onwards, and issued a record with Easter March songs in 1962–63. It played a particularly important role in keeping traditions of political song and folk music alive in West Germany, when they came under increasing suspicion of pro-communist leanings in the anti-communist climate of the Federal Republic.¹⁵³ This strand of traditions was especially prominent in the Ruhr area. Activists from the pacifist Catholic groups, Friends of Nature, the trade-union youth groups, and the Falcons retained their strong identification with these groups, while they were being slowly integrated into mainstream confessional and party cultures elsewhere in the Federal Republic.¹⁵⁴ There were important continuities between involvement in *FDJ* activities in the early 1950s and the Easter Marches in the early 1960s.¹⁵⁵

Pacifists

Only a minority of Easter March supporters came from the German Peace Society (*Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (DFG)*), which had been licensed in the British zone of occupation as early as November 1945 and managed to achieve an overall membership of about 30,000, comparable to that during the Weimar Republic.¹⁵⁶ The *DFG* moved closer and closer to fellow-travelling organizations, such as the *Deutsche Friedens-Union* in the early 1960s, so that the organization lost credibility for most middle-class pacifists. Cold war political culture therefore had a direct impact on (**p.120**) motivating pacifists to search for new forms of political activism that went beyond traditional middle-class pressure groups.¹⁵⁷ Although small in numbers, many non-violent pacifists played a vital role in the local and regional organization of the activities of the West German Campaign against Atomic Death and the Easter Marches. Often closely connected with religious and social-democratic politics, pacifists not only rejected nuclear weapons, but they also sought non-violent means of conflict

solution in society and politics. This group was, despite strong traditions in Britain, much more influential in the West German movement.

The organizer of the first German Easter March, the Hamburg teacher Hans-Konrad Tempel, a Quaker, epitomized this background. He argued from a position of strict non-violence in politics in general and international affairs in particular, and argued that this could be achieved only if social relations in everyday life created security through non-violence.¹⁵⁸ Tempel belonged to the strictly anti-communist Association of Conscientious Objectors (*Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer (VK)*). Ten thousand members strong, the VK had been founded by left-wing trade unionists, SPD members, and former supporters of the now defunct neutralist *Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei* around Helene Wessel and Gustav Heinemann as a conscientious objectors' union in 1958.¹⁵⁹ Many of the original Easter March activists knew each other through the Hamburg Action Group for Non-Violence around Tempel, through which regular workshops on the revitalization of citizenship through non-violent direct action had been held since the early 1950s, and were in close contact with their British colleagues.¹⁶⁰

This group, dissatisfied with an approach that focused on military service only, had already organized the first West German vigil against nuclear weapons in April 1958, following a meeting of the Hamburg Campaign against Atomic Death. In December 1959, it organized a vigil against French nuclear weapons tests at the French Consulate General in **(p.121)** Hamburg. After the press reports on 6 December 1959 about the stationing of British Honest-John missiles in Bergen-Hohne, the group decided to organize a march to the area.¹⁶¹ The planning for the Easter March was taken over by a committee for the Easter March to the rocket test site Bergen-Hohne, with Tempel as spokesman and coordinator.¹⁶² The VK's federal executive endorsed the 'enterprise "Easter March"' at the end of January 1960 and underwrote the venture with 300 Marks. Initially, the Hessian section of the social-democratic 'Friends of Nature' youth organization also expressed an interest in taking part, but eventually cancelled over fears of a lack of participation.¹⁶³

Equally important for local and regional activities of the Campaign against Atomic Death and the Easter Marches were the supporters around the other main conscientious objectors' association, the 7,000-strong *Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner (IdK)*, the official West German branch of the War Resisters' International. The *IdK* followed the traditions of the middle-class socialist Federation of War Resisters (*Bund der Kriegsdienstgegner*), which had been founded around the feminist Helene Stöcker in 1919. While non-violence played an important role here as well, the activists' emphasis on active grass-roots citizenship with the aim of thoroughly reforming all social relationships played a much stronger role than in the VK.¹⁶⁴ Important for the networks were a conference centre in the north German town of Bückeberg and discussion circles

around the non-violent pacifist Nikolaus Koch. Nikolaus Koch was the head of the Catholic Academy in Harzburg, but also had close connections to a Buddhist life reform group around Paul Debes and Helmut Hecker in Hamburg.¹⁶⁵ Conscientious objectors played a far less important role within CND, as National Service was to be phased out by 1960, paradoxically as the result of Britain's shift to a strategy of nuclear deterrence.¹⁶⁶ Activists joining CND from associations like the PPU played an even less important role **(p.122)** than pacifists in the West German campaign, although the PPU's paper *Peace News* initially served as the movement's main form of media communication.¹⁶⁷

Fellowship and Community

The debates about nuclear weapons, therefore, highlighted the ways in which the cold war nuclear arms race worked to create community. To some extent, the debates within the various groups, especially within the Labour and socialist parties and the churches, were also debates about ideas and practices of forging social bonds and thus involved different concepts of socialization. For the activists, 'community' and 'society' were not opposed forms of social organization. Instead, the language of 'community' and 'fellowship' was both a precondition for and a result of the social interactions between protesters from very different backgrounds. As the terms 'community' and 'fellowship' were able to speak to very different political and social groups—from Christians over pacifists to humanists—they helped create a common identification. Moreover, once the movements had emerged, the concepts 'community' and 'fellowship' helped the activists find interpersonal security and, to outside observers, endowed the movements with a seeming homogeneity. While the relevance and the contents of these processes differed, the processes themselves during which such a 'fellowship' and 'community' emerged were remarkably similar.

While the British and West German activists' political experiences and expectations were very diverse, they nonetheless converged: they expressed dissonances between their hopes and projects and their experiences of the world around them in terms of their opposition to nuclear weapons. Christians could load the concept with meanings about Christian fellowship; pacifists and humanists with their hopes for a peaceful and rational world; for activists coming from the labour movement, it meant the realization of hopes for a socialist fellowship. It thus gave the protesters back the sense of belonging that they had lost in their own life worlds. On an international level, the concept of 'fellowship' also helped to create the impression of synchronicity between movements in different countries among observers and thus to make them appear as part of one global movement against nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁸

(p.123) Paradoxically, the ideas for such a community were quite similar to the ideas and realities of military male comradeship and thus possessed highly gendered connotations.¹⁶⁹ 'Human fellowship' focused on the duties of its practitioners towards each other to treat each other equally, respectfully, and

fairly. In contrast to military notions of comradeship, however, the movement's concept of fellowship did not centre around fighting, but defined endurance in emphatically non-violent ways. Moreover, the concept of 'universal fellowship' differed from military ideas of comradeship by creating a feeling of belonging without excluding specific groups a priori. Rather, its very strength lay in the overlap of exclusive and inclusive elements: it created a feeling of exclusivity among the protesters, while still maintaining a universal appeal.¹⁷⁰

Fellowship was not just a theoretical concept, but it was also practised on the marches, by activists eating in communal kitchens, sleeping together in tents, and singing together, or merely by marching together. Particularly West German Easter March activists appropriated youth-movement traditions while marching, using specific forms of dress and the characteristic banners (see Figure 2).

The ordering of this community was leisurely, yet orderly, and was, despite accusations of communist subversion, in marked contrast to the military style of communist comradeship in the earlier 1950s.

Within the fellowship, women activists rarely made direct claims for specific female interests: neither in Britain nor in West Germany did the presence of women campaigners lead to salient female arguments about 'peace' and 'security'. In both movements, arguments that defined women as mothers and claimed their specific responsibilities for future generations were confined to the debates about nuclear weapons tests, rather than nuclear disarmament generally. Although social policies in both countries aimed to reconstruct families around motherhood, explicit mention of a politics of motherhood sat oddly with the dominant anti-totalitarian cold war consensus.¹⁷¹ In the Federal Republic in particular, arguments of motherhood conjured up memories of National Socialist **(p.124)**

policies; since 1945, they had also come to be associated with communist arguments. In the cold war context, therefore, most female campaigners preferred to use seemingly gender-neutral arguments about peace and security, and were content with campaigning under the auspices of (an essentially male) 'fellowship'.¹⁷²

The predominant idea of a gender-neutral 'fellowship' meant, therefore, that *explicitly* female contributions to the campaigns against nuclear (p. 125) weapons and towards security remained invisible and were pushed to the margins of the campaign.¹⁷³ The ambiguities of the gendered politics of security come into even sharper relief, if they are

seen against the background of governmental discourses about the position of men, women, and the family in politics. Both the British and the West German government specifically targeted women in their capacities as 'housewives and mothers' through their social policies. It seems that even women at the time regarded female activism outside the boundaries of 'hearth and home' only as legitimate if it coexisted with a denial of their womanhood. In the highly gendered environment of the campaigns, women were only rarely allowed to assert themselves as political activists—frequently, they were assigned household chores. John Saville's wife, for example, was allowed to stay with Eric Hobsbawm in London for the Easter March weekend under the condition that she prepared meals for him.¹⁷⁴ And, if women did participate in the general movement debates, they were frequently ridiculed or ignored.¹⁷⁵ Nonetheless, specifically women in their late forties and early fifties, often with backgrounds in the moderate suffrage movement (among them Peggy Duff, Vera Brittain, Diana Collins, Jacquetta Hawkes, the Labour politician Edith Summerskill, and the biologist Antoinette Pirie), played important roles as campaign organizers both on the national and at local levels. While the trend was less pronounced in West Germany, women still participated in the movements as citizens concerned about nuclear weapons, yet not as acting subjects. The Hampstead branch of the Women's Cooperative Guild had played a key role in the organizational formation of one of the first-single issue campaigns against nuclear weapons, the National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT).¹⁷⁶ In Britain,



Figure 2. Easter March North 'From Bergen-Hohne to Hamburg', Hans-Konrad Tempel, centre, 1961. (Image courtesy of HIS, TEM 200, B01)

CND's Women's Group ceased to function as a separate body by 1960, and its successor, the Liaison Committee for Women's Peace Groups, never managed to define the parameters of the discussion.¹⁷⁷ In the West German movement, such sections had never existed. While groups that advanced maternalist arguments, such as WOMAN (World Organization of Mothers of All Nations), participated in the campaigns, they never played a decisive role for the movement rhetoric and discourses.¹⁷⁸ These **(p.126)** findings, nonetheless, sit rather awkwardly with approaches that highlight the 'remasculinization' of British and West German societies during this period.¹⁷⁹ While the discourse might have been gender neutral, women still voiced their experiences and thus constituted themselves as active campaigners.

The historical specificity of the fellowship and community the movements created lay in the fact that the language and practice of community managed to bring together the very activists without forcing them to give up previous identities and identifications. The activists thus engaged in the politics of security in a double sense: first, and explicitly, by offering alternative visions of the cold war order; and, second, by providing a variety of activists with individual security by giving them a community and endowing their political views with new meanings.

Notes:

(¹) Jeffrey Herf, 'Multiple Restorations: German Political Traditions and the Interpretation of Nazism, 1945-1946', *Central European History*, 26 (1993), 21-55.

(²) Geoff Eley, 'Legacies of Antifascism: Constructing Democracy in Postwar Europe', *New German Critique*, 67 (1996), 73-100; Sean Forner, 'Für eine demokratische Erneuerung Deutschlands: Kommunikationsprozesse und Deutungsmuster engagierter Demokraten nach 1945', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 33 (2007), 228-57.

(³) Geoff Eley, 'When Europe was New: Liberation and the Making of the Post-War Era', in Monica Riera and Gavin Schaffer (eds), *The Lasting War. Society and Identity in Britain, France and Germany after 1945* (Basingstoke, 2008), 17-43, here 39.

(⁴) Jose Harris, 'Political Ideas and the Debate on State Welfare, 1940-45', in Harold L. Smit (ed.), *War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War* (Manchester, 1986), 233-63, here 236.

(⁵) J. B. Priestley, 'Britain and the Nuclear Bombs', *New Statesman*, 54 (2 November 1957), 554-6, here 554.

⁽⁶⁾ For the general context, see Peter Mandler and Susan Pedersen, 'Introduction: The British Intelligentsia after the Victorians', in Mandler and Pedersen (eds), *After the Victorians: Private Conscience and Public Duty in Modern Britain* (London and New York, 1994), 1–28.

⁽⁷⁾ Jon Lawrence, 'Paternalism, Class, and the British Path to Modernity', in Simon Gunn and James Vernon (eds), *The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in Imperial Britain* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2011) 147–64, here 158.

⁽⁸⁾ Jed Esty, *A Shrinking Island. Modernism and National Culture in England* (Princeton, 2004), 9–11.

⁽⁹⁾ Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850–1930* (Oxford, 1991); Collini, *Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain* (Oxford, 2006), 171–5 (on the 'long fifties') and 375–92 (on A. J. P. Taylor).

⁽¹⁰⁾ Mervyn Jones, *Chances* (London, 1987), 161.

⁽¹¹⁾ MRC, MSS 157/3/I/CS/1-78: John Collins to Victor Gollancz, 21 February 1947; Collins, *Faith under Fire*; Rob Skinner, 'The Moral Foundations of British Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1946–1960', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35 (2009), 399–416; Tom Buchanan, *East Wind. China and the British Left, 1925–1970* (Oxford, 2012).

⁽¹²⁾ Cecil Hewitt Rolph, *Kingsley: The Life, Letters and Diary of Kingsley Martin* (London, 1973), 323–5.

⁽¹³⁾ Morgan, *Labour People*, 278.

⁽¹⁴⁾ J. B. Priestley, 'Making Writing Simple', in Priestley, *Delight* (London, 1949), 71.

⁽¹⁵⁾ Cf. Chris Waters, 'J. B. Priestley 1894–1984: Englishness and the Politics of Nostalgia', in Pedersen and Mandler (eds), *After the Victorians*, 209–24; John Baxendale, *Priestley's England: J. B. Priestley and English Culture* (Manchester, 2007).

⁽¹⁶⁾ Ronald W. Clark, *The Life of Bertrand Russell* (London 1975), 119.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Cf. Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness 1921–1970* (London, 2000), 163–216.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Bertrand Russell, 'A Fifty-Six Year Friendship', in *Gilbert Murray: An Unfinished Autobiography* (London, 1960), 209.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Duff, *Left, Left, Left*.

⁽²⁰⁾ MRC, MSS 181: Executive Committee, minutes, 27 February 1958.

⁽²¹⁾ MRC, MSS 157/3/ND/152: Gollancz to Canon Collins, 15 September 1959; Ruth Dudley Edwards, *Victor Gollancz: A Biography* (London, 1987).

⁽²²⁾ Bertrand Russell, 'Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament', in Ian Hey (ed.), *80th Birthday Book for Ernest Darwin Simon: Lord Simon of Wythenshawe, b. 9th October 1879* (Stockport, 1959), 61–2, here 62.

⁽²³⁾ Manchester Archives and Local Studies Unit (MALSU), M 11 8/2: Nuclear Diary, 1.

⁽²⁴⁾ Richard Acland, *Only One Battle* (London, 1937), 92.

⁽²⁵⁾ J. B. Priestley, 'Hard Times', *Listener*, 23 October 1947, 711–12; 30 October 1947, 755–6; 6 November 1947, 804–5.

⁽²⁶⁾ A. J. P. Taylor, *A Personal History* (London, 1983), 229; A. J. P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939* (London, 1957). On the background cf. Kathleen Burk, *Troublemaker. The Life and History of A. J. P. Taylor* (New Haven and London, 2000), 212–18.

⁽²⁷⁾ 'The Seventh Veil', *New Statesman*, 28 September 1957, 376–7.

⁽²⁸⁾ Stuart Samuels, 'The Left Book Club', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (1966), 65–86; Ben Pimlott, *Labour and the Left in the 1930s* (Cambridge, 1977).

⁽²⁹⁾ E. R. Norman, *Church and Society in England, 1770–1970* (Oxford, 1976), 280–370.

⁽³⁰⁾ *The Times*, 4 April 1972, p. 2.

⁽³¹⁾ BLPES, CND/1/3: Newsletter Oxford University CND, October 1960.

⁽³²⁾ Jonathan Schneer, 'Hopes Deferred or Shattered: The British Labour Left and the Third Force Movement, 1945–1949', *Journal of Modern History*, 56 (1984), 199–200.

⁽³³⁾ On these debates, cf. Black, *The Political Culture of the Left*.

⁽³⁴⁾ For example, in his acceptance speech for the peace prize of the German booksellers' association in 1963; cf. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, *Der bedrohte Frieden: Politische Aufsätze 1945–1981* (Munich, 1983), 125–37; Otto Hahn, *Mein Leben* (Munich, 1968), 231; Werner Kliefoth, 'Atomrundschau', *Atomkernenergie*, 2 (1957), 50.

⁽³⁵⁾ Text in Weizsäcker, *Der bedrohte Friede*, 29–30.

⁽³⁶⁾ Andrew Brown, *Keeper of the Nuclear Conscience: The Work and Life of Joseph Rotblat* (Oxford, 2012), 119–34. On perceptions in West Germany, see, for example, *Hannoversche Presse*, 11 July 1955.

⁽³⁷⁾ On the roots and structures of this thinking, see Bernd Weisbrod, 'Philanthropie und bürgerliche Kultur: Zur Sozialgeschichte des viktorianischen Bürgertums', in Hartmut Berghoff und Dieter Ziegler (eds), *Pionier und Nachzügler? Vergleichende Studien zur Geschichte Großbritanniens und Deutschlands im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung, Festschrift für Sidney Pollard* (Bochum, 1995), 205–20, here 209.

⁽³⁸⁾ (http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/dokumente/JahreDesAufbausInOstUndWest_erklaerungGoettingerErklaerung/index.html) (accessed 15 April 2012).

⁽³⁹⁾ 13 April 1957, *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III*, 3, 597–604, on 597–8; Carson, *Heisenberg in the Atomic Age*, 323, 338.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ Ulrich Raulff, *Kreis ohne Meister: Stefan Georges Nachleben. Eine abgründige Geschichte* (Munich, 2010), 409–27.

⁽⁴¹⁾ Cf. Guy Ortolano, *The Two Cultures Controversy: Science, Literature, and Cultural Politics in Postwar Britain* (Cambridge, 2009).

⁽⁴²⁾ The text of the manifesto can be found in Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch (eds), *The Atomic Age: Scientists in National and World Affairs. Articles from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (New York, 1963), 12. On the origins of the declaration and its reception in Britain, cf. Bertrand Russell, 'World Conference of Scientists', *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 12 (1956), 41–3; Werner Kliefoth, 'Der Geist von Pugwash', *Atomkernenergie*, 3 (1958), 455–8.

⁽⁴³⁾ Brown, *Keeper of the Nuclear Conscience*, 135–47.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ Text in Joseph Rotblat, *Scientists in the Quest for Peace*, 139; German discussions in AdsD, Karl Bechert papers, 21: Minutes of the Membership Association of German Physical Associations, 25 September 1955, 3–7.

⁽⁴⁵⁾ *Vorwärts*, 17 May 1957, 1.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Cf. Hans Paul Bahrtdt, 'Schamanen der modernen Gesellschaft? Das Verhältnis der Wissenschaftler zur Politik', *atomzeitalter*, 4 (1961), 75–9; Kurt Sontheimer, 'Erfordert das Atomzeitalter eine neue politische Wissenschaft?', *Zeitschrift für Politik*, ns 11 (1964), 208–23; Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, *Die Verantwortung der Wissenschaft im Atomzeitalter* (Göttingen, 1957).

(⁴⁷) Hans Baumgarten, 'Die Taktik der Atomforscher', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 April 1957, 1; AdsD, ASAF000177: Willy Huhn to Ansgar Skriver and Manfred Rexin, 27 November 1959.

(⁴⁸) Cf., for example, Prof. Dr. Walther Gerlach, 'Die Verantwortung des Physikers', *Stimme der Gemeinde*, 10 (1958), cols 129-34.

(⁴⁹) Robert Lorenz, *Protest der Physiker: Die 'Göttinger Erklärung' von 1957* (Bielefeld, 2011), 218.

(⁵⁰) Robert Jungk, *Heller als Tausend Sonnen* (Frankfurt/Main, 1956) (English edn: London 1958). This has, however, been proven a myth by Mark Walker, 'Legenden um die deutsche Atombombe', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 38 (1990), 45-74.

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(⁵²) Hans Werner Richter to Ernst Nolte, 10 March 1957, in Hans Werner Richter, *Briefe*, ed. Sabine Cofalla (Munich, 1997), 245; Richter to Leonhardt, 11 November 1961, in Richter, *Briefe*, 378-9.

(⁵³) HWR, 72.86.512, 65: Press Statement of the Munich Committee against Atomic Armaments, 14 April 1958; HWR, 72.85.526, 42-63: Hans Werner Richter, 'Bilanz einer Generation' [1967].

(⁵⁴) On the general context in West Germany, see Christian Schmidtman, *Katholische Studierende 1945-1973: Ein Beitrag zur Kultur- und Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Paderborn, 2005), and Holger Nehring, '“The long, long night is over”: The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, “Generation” and the Politics of Religion (1957-1964)', in Jane Garnett et al. (eds), *Redefining Christian Britain* (London, 2007), 138-47.

(⁵⁵) Roger Ruston, *A Say in the End of the World: Morals and British Nuclear Weapons Policy 1941-1987* (Oxford, 1989), 17-20.

(⁵⁶) British Council of Churches, *The Era of Atomic Power* (London, 1946), 7, 19; *Evanston to New Delhi 1954-1961: Report of the Central Committee to the Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches, New Delhi* (Geneva, 1961); Dianne Kirby, 'The Church of England and the Cold War Nuclear Debate', *Twentieth Century British History*, 4 (1993), 250-83.

(⁵⁷) Driver, *The Disarmers*, 200; Kirby, 'Church', 281.

(⁵⁸) Quoted in *Die Welt*, 19 February 1958; 'Kirche, Atom, Friede', *Junge Kirche*, 19 (1958), 159-63, here 160; George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, *Nuclear War and Peace* (= Peace Aims Pamphlet, no. 60) (London, 1955), 48-54; British Council of

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(⁵⁹) Bell, *Nuclear War and Peace*.

(⁶⁰) Gerhard Schmidtchen, *Protestanten und Katholiken. Soziologische Analyse konfessioneller Kultur* (Berne, 1973), 244.

(⁶¹) Walter Dirks, 'Christ und Bürger in der Bundesrepublik', *Frankfurter Hefte*, 13 (1958), 673–85, here 673. Cf. Daniel Gerster, *Friedensdialoge im Kalten Krieg: Eine Geschichte der Katholiken in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt/Main, 2012), 56–76.

(⁶²) *Berlin 1958: Bericht über die Tagung der zweiten Synode der EKD* (Hanover, 1959), 455–6; 'Heidelberger Thesen' [1959], printed in Günther Howe (ed.), *Atomzeitalter, Krieg und Frieden* (Witten and Berlin, 1959), 226–36. For Britain, see *The Times*, 26 August 1958, 4; *The Church and the World: The Bulletin of the British Council of Churches* (June/July 1959), 1–2.

(⁶³) Martin Greschat, *Protestantismus im Kalten Krieg: Kirche, Politik und Gesellschaft im geteilten Deutschland* (Paderborn, 2010), 268–90 and 317–21.

(⁶⁴) T. R. Milford, *The Valley of Decision* (London, 1961), 36.

(⁶⁵) British Council of Churches, *The British Nuclear Deterrent* (London, 1963), 6, 28.

(⁶⁶) Quote from *Baptist Times*, 16 November 1961, 10. Cf. also *The Friend*, 21 September 1962, 1166; Walter Stein (ed.), *Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience* (London, 1961), 151.

(⁶⁷) Walter Dirks, 'Die Gefahr der Gleichschaltung', *Frankfurter Hefte*, 13 (1958), H. 6, 379–81; Helmut Gollwitzer, *Forderungen der Freiheit: Aufsätze und Reden zur politischen Ethik* (Munich, 1957), 347.

(⁶⁸) *Methodist Recorder*, 17 May 1962, 9; Martin Niemöller, 'Kirche und Gesellschaft an der Schwelle einer neuen Zeit', *Stimme der Gemeinde*, 12 (1960), cols 265–72.

(⁶⁹) *Coracle*, 27 (November 1955), 15; *Coracle*, 31 (November 1957), 23; *Coracle*, 34 (March 1959), 3; *Coracle* 37 (November 1960), 31; 'Erklärung des Konvents der Kirchl. Bruderschaft im Rheinland zur atomaren Bewaffnung, Wermelskirchen, Ostern 1957', in Gottfried Niemeier (ed.), *Evangelische Stimmen zur Atomfrage* (Hanover, 1958), 49; Ernst Wolf and Werner Schmauch, et al., *Christusbekenntnis im Atomzeitalter?* (Munich, 1959).

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(⁷¹) Gerhard Beestermöller, 'Krieg', *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* (Freiburg/Breisgau, 1997), vi, cols 475–9.

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(⁷³) Walter Dirks, 'Die Gefahr der Gleichschaltung', *Frankfurter Hefte*, 13 (1958), 379–91.

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(⁷⁷) *Christian World*, 27 March 1958, 8; *The Friend*, 14 September 1962, 1133; Canon John Collins, *Christian Action* (autumn 1961), 18; Walter Dirks, 'Christ und Bürger in der Bundesrepublik', *Frankfurter Hefte*, 13 (1958), 673–85, here 674.

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